Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty by Jaeger, Walter H. E.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 5 Article 1
8-1-1964
Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty
Walter H. E. Jaeger
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walter H. Jaeger, Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39 Notre Dame L. Rev. 501 (1964).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol39/iss5/1
NOTRE DAME A 
N.
VOL. XXXX AUGUST, 1964 No. 5
PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CONSTRUCTIVE WARRANTY*
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Within the past decade, and especially during the past five years, the number
of jurisdictions which have permitted recovery by the ultimate consumer for
breach of warranty in other than food cases has steadily increased. Somewhat
reminiscent of the early development of tort liability where the first deviation
from the privity requirement occurred in connection with the sale of a drug
or pharmaceutical, the early departures from privity of contract were concerned
with food, beverages, drugs and similar or related products.
Paralleling the development of actions in tort are the many cases dealing
with automobiles, automotive accessories and other mechanical devices, beginning
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with that celebrated landmark, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,1 which,
in a few short years, has become a classic, repeatedly cited and quoted.'
Fully as significant as the evolution of case law is the adoption, -by a sub-
stantial majority of the jurisdictions, of the Uniform Commercial Code.' It
makes two specific inroads on the privity "requirement." 4 One is in favor of a
member of the family or of the household or a guest in the home of the pur-
chaser of the product which results in injury to the consumer or user.5 The
other eliminates an atavistic and decidedly archaic survival of an earlier era, the
notion that purveying food to a traveler is a service and not a sale.6 This has
been specifically changed (for the better) by the Code.'
In certain jurisdictions, as will be seen, the requirement (so-called) of
privity has been expressly abolished by statute. In many others, courts have un-
hesitatingly assumed the responsibility for "judicial legislation," mindful of the
role the early judges played in creating the artificial stricture of privity. Some
1 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
2 Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., Inc., 376 U.S. 315 (1964); Schultz v. Tecum-
seh Products, 310 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1962); Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d
19 (5th Cir. 1963); Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963); Stearns v. Hertz
Corp., 326 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1964); Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961),
aff'd 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929 (D. Del.
1962); Duckworth v. Ford Motor Company, 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Rogers v.
Hexol, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 453 (D. Ore. 1962); Picker X-Ray Corp., v. General Motors Corp.,
185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Ct. App. 1962); Simpson v. Logan Motor Co., 192 A.2d 122 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1963); George v. Willman, 379 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1963); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod-
ucts, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 67, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962); Simpson v. Powered Products
of Michigan, Inc., 24 Conn. Sup. 409, 192 A.2d 555 (1963); Posey v. Pensacola Tractor & Equip-
ment Co., 138 So.2d 777 (Fla. App. 1962); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); Reed v. Bunger, 122 N.W.2d
290 (Iowa 1963); Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corporation, 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963);
Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Company, 382 P.2d 399 (Nev. 1963); Tackling v. Chrysler Cor-
poration, 77 N.J. Super 12, 185 A.2d 238 (1962); Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Manu-
facturing, 80 N.J. Super 184, 193 A.2d 275 (1963); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 213
N.Y.S.2d 39, 173 N.E.2d 773 (1961); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Company,
11 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962); United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Balcrank,
Ine, 193 N.E.2d 920 (Oh. 1963); Payne v. Valley Motor Sales, Inc., 124 S.E.2d 622 (W.Va.
1962).
As a partial indication of the importance attached to the decision in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1, a number of legal periodicals which have noted or dis-
cussed the case are listed:
12 Baylor L.Rev. 345 (1960); 2 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.Rev. 133 (1960); 48 Calif. L.Rev.
873 (1960); 46 Corn. L.Q. 607 (1961); 65 Dick. L.Rev. 64 (1960); 29 Fordham L.Rev.
183 (1960); 74 Harv. L.Rev. 630 (1961); 59 Mich. L.Rev. 467 (1961); 7 N.Y. L.F. 59
(1961); 39 N.C. L.Rev. 299 (1961); 36 Notre Dame Law. 233 (1961); 40 Ore. L.Rev. 364
1961); 14 Rutgers L.Rev. 829 (1960); 35 St. John's L.Rev. 178 (1960); 13 S.C.L.Q. 131
1960); 12 Syracuse L.Rev. 123 (1960); 39 Tex. L.Rev. 694 (1961); 8 U.C.L.A. L.Rev.
658 (1961); 29 U.Cin. L.Rev. 519 (1960); 38 U.Det. L.J. 218 (1960); 109 U. Pa. L.Rev. 453
(1961); 14 Vand. L.Rev. 681 (1961); 18 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 124 (1961); 7 Wayne L.Rev.
382 (1960); 12 Western Res. L.Rev. 387 (1961).
3 Jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code: Alaska, Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, 2-318.
5 As a third party beneficiary of express or implied warranties, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-318.
6 As held in Nisky v. Childs Company, 103 N.J.L. 464, 135 At. 805 (Ct. Err. & App.
1927).
7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314 reads in pertinent part: "Under this section the
serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale."
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judges have suggested that if there is to be a change, it should be accomplished
by the legislature rather than by the courts.
In future discussions of this subject, insofar as products other than food or
its analogues are concerned, Henningsen will no doubt be considered the turning
point. In an elaborate, well-considered and far-reaching opinion, Mr. Justice
Francis, speaking for all of his brethren of the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
boldly broke away from the outworn and harmful privity concept and held for
the plaintiff-wife of the purchaser of an automobile in which she was injured."
In its telling effect, this decision can certainly be compared with that of Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Go.9 in the field of tort law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Out of the welter of cases and the confusion and controversy surrounding
product liability, certain questions emerge: Should the remedy be in tort?
Should it be in contract? Or does it have to be in either? One thing is crystal
dear: Nothing could be less material to the injured consumer than the manner
of his recovery, provided he recovers.
The purpose of this article is to suggest that an action for breach of warranty,
more specifically, constructive warranty or one imposed by law, need not sound
in either tort or contract." Actually some of the courts have not been too
concerned with what they have described as unnecessary and unwanted legal
niceties.1
Traditionally, the tort cases were the first to break away from the repressive
concept of privity and the proponents of the tort action in product liability cases
have the advantage of an early start. However, associated with "tort" is the
fundamental notion of "fault," "negligence," or "lack of due care." Yet, what
is needed to afford the consumer adequate protection is absolute liability of-the
8 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1.
9 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
10 See MURPHY, CONTRACTS CASEBOOK 1057 (temp. ed. 1964).
11 Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961) aff'd 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1962); Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); Thompson v. Reedman, 199
F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919
(Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1962); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799
(1939); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 67, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d
897 (1962); Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961); Simpson v. Powered
Products of Michigan, Inc., 24 Conn.Sup. 409, 192 A.2d 555 (1963); Hector Supply Co. v.
Carter, 122 So.2d 22 (Fla. App. 1960); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169 (Fla.
1963) discussed in Jaeger, NEWSLETTER, General Practice Section, ABA Volume 1, No. 3
(Jan. 1964), p. 1; State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa
1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77
P.2d 930 (1938); Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., 157 Me. 10, 170 A.2d 160 (1961); Spence v.
Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Manzoni v.
Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d 918 (1961); Midwest Game Co.
v. M. F. A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959); Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372
S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963); Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d
532 (1952); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1; Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9
N.Y.2d 195, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 173 N.E.2d 773 (1961); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 181 N.B.2d 399 (1962); Goldberg v. Kolls-
man Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963); Parish v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 13 Misc.2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958); Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 4 Ohio Op. 2d 291, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958); General Motors
Corp. v. Dodson, 338 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps
139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633
(1913); LaHue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash.2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957).
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manufacturer, producer or processor of the defective product. And here, the
advocates of the contract remedy are stymied by the unfortunate strictures of the
so-called "privity requirement." Since neither remedy appears satisfactory, and
since there is no compelling need for the use of either, it is submitted that a
distinct remedy for breach of constructive (or implied in law) warranty may
have evolved which is sui generis, and hopefully, sui juris.
In this action, then, absolute liability would be imposed upon the manu-
facturer in an action by the ultimate consumer or user of the former's product
regardless of fault or privity. In warranties imposed by law, absence of mutuality
of assent has no significance, whereas in the case of express or implied-in-fact
warranties, mutuality of assent is significant; these warranties being part of the
consideration bargained for, privity is important. But even here, at least in
certain types of cases, the third party beneficiary doctrine has been recognized
and applied. 2
On the other hand, simply because the warranty is imposed by law or is
"constructive" is no reason why the remedy for its breach must be in tort.
Historically, it is true that ten years after the ill-advised obiter opinions in Winter-
bottom v. Wright' were rendered, Thomas v. Winchester4 decided that privity
would be no bar to an action in tort where negligence was involved. Three score
and four years later, the classic case of MacPherson"5 consecrated and enlarged
this departure and concluded that the defendant company "owed a duty of care
and vigilance" to others besides the immediate purchaser.'6
But even with these inroads upon the doctrine of privity, once the plaintiff
failed to prove negligence (or defendant showed "due care"), there was still
no recovery: Thus, the remedy in tort left (and still leaves) much to be desired."
Within the last half-century, the courts began to recognize the rights of an
ultimate consumer where a breach of warranty was the basis for his cause of
12 Discussed in Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 11, citing numer-
ous cases including Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928)
and Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). The court lists the following
states as having rejected the privity requirement completely: California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
Washington. In light of the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Hochgertel v.
Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963), it would seem that the inclusion of
Pennsylvania in this group of jurisdictions, based on Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445
(3d Cir. 1946), is no longer accurate.
13 10 Mees. & W. 109, 11 L.J. Ex.415, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); the statement of
Abinger, C.B. was to the effect that "every passenger, or even any person passing along the
road, who is injured by the upsetting of the coach" could sue; by way of dictum, he observed
that there was "no privity of contract between these parties," and therefore defendant should
have judgment.
Sharing this view, Alderson, B., was of the opinion that if the plaintiff could sue, "there
is nopoint at which such actions would stop." He concluded that "the only safe rule is to con-
fine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract."
14 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
15 Supra note 10.
16 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 385, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
17 ..In addition to having to prove negligence, the plaintiff may be defeated by contributory
negligence or even "assumption of risk." Cf. Chapman v. Brown supra note 11, for a discussion
of these defenses which were held inapplicable in the opinion rendered by Judge Tavares, speak-
ing for the federal district court of Hawaii. In Smith v. Albert, 168 N.E.2d 495 (Ohio App.
1959., the court discussed the questions of contributory negligence and assumption of risk m
connection with a case involving the personal injuries of a farm employee who fell from a
wooden ladder. Basically, the court had to determine whether such a ladder "as a matter of
law" is a "simple tool." A split of authority was noted; the leading case holding it to be a jury
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action. As in the case of the tort remedy as noted above, the fitr,.departure from
the "requirement" of privity occurred in cases involving foods, beverages, or
related products."5 And here again, as in the case of torts, the next- truly
significant break with precedent involved an action arising out of the sale of a
defectively manufactured automobile, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc."9
Most recently several of the leading jurisdictions have discarded privity entirely
and, as to certain types of products, have applied the doctrine of absolute
liability.2" While the list is growing, there seems to be a standard criterion for
determining when privity is to be discarded: Has the consumption or use of
the product caused the death or personal injury of the plaintiff?
The reaction of many courts to the artificial requirement of privity has been
well summarized: "The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made
to depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales."'" If to this is added: "Nor
upon the subtle niceties of the law of torts," the consumer would undoubtedly
utter a fervent amen to these sentiments.
Now turning to the cases, and then to the statutes, the evolution, develop-
ment and emergence of a distinct cause of action for breach of "constructive"
or implied-in-law warranty will be examined and discussed.
question and which the Ohio court followed is Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 1 Cal.2d .229,
34 P.2d 481 (1934). Said the Ohio court, at 499: "After a careful examination of the record
in this case, including the splendid briefs furnished by counsel and the decisions in many juris-
dictions involving actions for personal injuries resulting from the use of a defective ladder,.and
especially the decisions of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky classifying a stepladder and a
'chicken ladder' as not being 'simple tools,' we must conclude that the uncontradicted evidence
adduced by the plaintiff presents an issuable fact to be determined by the jury; that this court
cannot say, as a matter of law, that the ladder used by the plaintiff was a 'simple tool' and
that the issues of negligence by the defendants and contributory negligence and assumption of
risk by the plaintiff are questions that should be submitted to the jury."
18 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (Ist Cir.
1958); Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 267 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1959) reversing 163
F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tex. 1958); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292- (3d
Cir. 1961); Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); Klein v. Duchess Sand-
wich Co., 14 Cal.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App.2d
18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954); Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp. 39 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949);
Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1953); Tiffin v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 18 Ill.2d 48, 162 N.E.2d 406 (1959); Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318
Ill. App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1943); Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 332' Il.
App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947); Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ill. App.2d 175,
132 N.E.2d 442 (1956); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382, 17
A.L.R. 649 (1920); Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930
(1938); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317, 38 A.L.R.2d 887 (1953); Pernes v.
Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 183 Kan. 758, 332 P.2d 258 (1958); Le Blanc v. Louisiana
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So.2d 873 (1952); Miller v. Louisiana Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 70 So.2d 409 (La. App. 1954); Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., 157 Me. 10, 170
A.2d 160 (1961); Rainwater v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 131 Miss. 315, 95 So. 444
(1923); Biedenharn Candy Co., v. Moore, 184 Miss. 721, 186 So. 628 (1939); Greenberg v.
Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 173 N.E.2d 773 (1961); Parish v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 13 Misc.2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958) ; Markovich v. McKes-
son & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265,7 Ohio Op.2d 10, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 111, 149 N.E.2d 181
(1958); Cook v. Safeway Stores Inc., 330 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1958); Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Atl. 537 (1931); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc., v. Capps, 139
Tex. 609 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 328 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1959); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913); LaHue v. Coca-
Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash.2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957).
19 Supra note 1.
20 Chapman v. Brown, supra note 11; Picker X-Ray v. General Motors Corp., supra note
11; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra note 11; Hamon v. Digliani, supra note 11;
Green v. American Tobacco Company and other cases listed supra note 11.
21 Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
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II. DEFINITION, NATURE AND TYPES OF WARRANTY
Definition and Nature
A warranty is a statement or representation made by the seller of goods
contemporaneously with, and as a part of, the contract of sale, although col-
lateral to the express object of it, having reference to the character, quality, or
title of the goods, and by which he promises or undertakes to insure that certain
facts are or shall be as he then represents them. A warranty is express when
the seller makes an affirmation with respect to the article to be sold, pending the
treaty of sale, on which it is intended that the buyer shall rely in making the
purchase; and there is authority for the proposition that any warranty derived
from express language should be considered an express warranty. A warranty
is implied when the law derives it by implication or inference from the nature
of the transaction, or the relative situation or circumstances of the parties.
Stated otherwise, an express warranty is one imposed by the parties to the con-
tract, while an implied warranty is not one of the contractual elements of an
agreement but is, instead, imposed by law.2
The afore-quoted definition of warranty appears in Mitchell v. Rudasill, s
decided a few years ago in Missouri. The cows, which were the subject matter
of the contract of sale, were found to have mastitis of the udder which prevented
them from giving wholesome milk. As the vendor had been made aware that
the cows were to be a part of the buyer's dairy herd, that suitable milk was an
essential, the court held that there had been a breach of the warranty of sound-
ness of the animals. Although the plaintiff had submitted his case on the theory
of implied warranty, he actually proved an express representation that the cows
had sound udders and would give "a decent flow of milk."24
A somewhat similar case, Reed v. Bunger,2 decided last year, involved an
22 Mitchell v. Rudasill, 332 S.W.2d 91, 94-95 (Mo.App. 1960).
23 332 S.W.2d 91 (Mo.App. 1960).
24 On this point, the court observed: "But it does not necessarily follow in this case that
the judgment must be reversed because the plaintiff submitted his case on the theory of an im-
plied warranty rather than that of an express warranty. While it has been stated, as defendant
urges, that an express warranty excludes an implied warranty, this has been criticized as too
broad a statement of the rule. Williston on Sales, Rev. Ed. Vol. 1, p. 625, Sec. 239a. A more
accurate statement of the correct rule is that an express warranty excludes an implied warranty
of fitness (1) if the express warranty is inconsistent with the warranty which would have been
,implied had none been expressed; or (2) if the express warranty relates to the same or a similar
subject matter as one which would have been implied. 164 A.L.R., p. 1328; Williston on Sales,
supra; 2 Mechem on Sales, p. 1095, Sec. 1295. In the principal case cited by defendant, Hunt
v. Sanders, 313 Mo. 169, 281 S.W. 422, 425, after stating the general rule, the court went on
to say: "Where the warranty expressly agreed upon is precisely the same as the one the law
would imply from the mere fact of sale, in case of breach it can be of no consequence whether
the warranty be regarded as express or as implied. In such case the distinction is without im-
portance except as to the matter of proof." Mitchell v. Rudasill, supra note 22.
In addition to the Mitchell case, there have been any number of similar cases involving
warranties of animals; among these may be cited: Ver Steegh v. Flaugh, 251 Iowa 1011, 103
N.W.2d 718 (1960), boar for breeding; Lyle v. W. H. Hodges & Co., 82 So.2d 457 (La. App.
1955), bull calf died some three days after purchase; warranty held breached; Grovedale Feed
Co. v. Corron, 155 N.E.2d 291 (Munic. Ct. of Findlay, Ohio 1957), chickens were sick, held
that warranty was breached; Vander Eyk v. Bones, 77 S.D. 345, 91 N.W.2d 897 (1958), Battle
Pioneer, a bull, failed to breed; however, as notice of breach was not given within a reasonable
time, the buyer could not rescind.
25 122 N.W.2d 290 (Iowa 1963); the court held that the word "goods" as used in the
statute, IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.77 (1950), is broad enough to include cattle, the subject matter
of the instant contract.
After a comprehensive review of the earlier cases upon which defendant relied, the court
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action by the buyer of twenty heifers against the vendor for breach of express
and implied warranties and for fraud. The trial court held that an express oral
warranty had been proved and that under the Uniform Sales Act2 an implied
warranty of fitness for the particular purpose for which the cows were purchased
had arisen since the plaintiff buyer had relied on defendant's "skill and judgment
in selecting the ones [heifers] to be shipped." Of the twenty head of cattle
which were sold, the court held a breach of warranty, either express or implied
or both, had occurred in the case of fifteen which were either older than rep-
resented, suffered from mastitis, or were otherwise unfit to furnish the required
quantity of milk.
In affirming judgment for plaintiff buyer, the Supreme Court of Iowa
noted a tendency "to narrow application of the rule of caveat emptor and extend
the doctrine of implied warranty in sales of personalty."2 In breach of implied
warranty actions, said the court, "the seller's lack of knowledge [that] it does
not comply with the warranty" and "Good faith and lack of the seller's negligence
are no defense."2
In Miller v. Penny,2 9 the subject matter of the sale and of the accompanying
warranty of fitness was a purebred bull, not a group of heifers as in the preceding
case. Eileenmere 627th, the fanciful appellation by which this "Grand Cham-
pion" of eleven prize contests was known, priced at $10,600 and sold for breed-
ing purposes, proved a complete disappointment to his new owner (not to
mention the cows). Granting rescission, the federal district court commented in
truly humorous vein:"0
Eileenmere 627th was born in the stable of luxury and raised
in the field of plenty. With a long line of champions as his an-
concluded that the uniform statute had liberalized the doctrine of warranty and restricted the
rule of caveat emptor. It held that the older decisions were no longer applicable.
26 UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 12, 15, IowA CODE ANN. §§ 554.13, 554.16, 554.77 "(1950).
27 Citing Drager v. Carlson Hybrid Corn Co., Inc., 244 Iowa 78, 56 N.W.2d 19 (1952);
Farmers State Bank v. Cook, 251 Iowa 942, 103 N.W.2d 704 (1960).
28 Reed v. Bunger, 122 N.W.2d 290, 298 (Iowa 1963), citing Ver Steegh v. Flaugh, 251
Iowa 1011, 103 N.W.2d 718 (1960) and Doden v. Housh, 251 Iowa 1271, 105 N.W.2d 78
(1960).
29 Miller v. Penney, 77 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Mo. 1948). Introducing the issues, the court
remarked: "This is a bull case, and I sincerely regret that I agreed to decide it rather than to
have it tried before a jury composed of stockmen and farmers who through experience would
have been more familiar with the commercial 'love life' of a 'blooded' bull than I.
While my youth was spent in rather close association with bulls, they were not the kind
involved here. They were common, plebeian bulls which at this time of the year roamed the
woods and fields and walked the fence rows, challenging with low growling moans or shrill
bellows every animate or inanimate object. They were bulls which pawed the dirt and rolled
their heads in impassioned, frenzied wrath that knew no bounds and respected no normal en-
closure. But Eileenmere 627th, No. 735647, is an aristocrat of the kine world, a product of
this age of high prices." Miller v. Penney, supra at 887-88.
30 This is delightfully illustrated by the following quotation from the opinion of the court:
"He was touted as the great son of a noble sire and heralded far and wife [wide?] as the out-
standing 'Star of the Year' and the new Junior Sire of an equally aristocratic herd of Aberdeen-
Angus cows and heifers. But, alas, while his meretricious charms made him a champion in the-
show ring, they were unavailing in the mating pen. The cruel hand of fate had destined the
great Eileenmere 627th, 735647, to be a celibate. Never could he become the proud Junior
Sire of so noble a herd, with ambitious visions no doubt of becoming, in time, a prouder Sen-
ior Sire; never would he know the proud, chest-expanding pride of seeing his own flesh and
blood walk the green pastures among a herd over which he would majestically preside. There
would be no Eleenmere 628th. Because of defective hind quarters and genital defects he was
physically unable to perform the mating act, which nature intended should result in reproduc-
tion. He was worthless for the purpose for which he was purchased." Miller v. Penney, id.
at 888.
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cestors, he was destined from the day he was calved to follow in
the hoofsteps of his illustrious progenitors. In this respect, at least,
he did not disappoint his "fitters" (a term applied to those who pre-
pare bulls for the show ring). Before he was two years old he had
traversed the "circuit," appearing in twelve shows. Eleven times he
was acclaimed as Grand Champion and the twelfth time as cham-
pion of his class. This is no mean record where competition in
glamour and other bullish qualities, obscure to the uninitiated, is
so pronounced as it is in the world of show bulls. Finally having
won his laurels as a great star in the show ring, he attracted by his
reputation the "big money" buyers. After this was accomplished,
he, like most others of his kind, was removed from the tinselled sur-
roundings of the show world and returned to his home that he might
bring to the enjoyment of his owners the fruits of his success.13
Types
At the very outset it is essential to understand the distinction between
various types of warranty in order that the confusion be not worsened as has
been the case in some of the decisions.3 2 The true warranty, as it has developed
from the early concept of deceit, is quite generally deemed contractual. This
includes: both express and implied-in-fact warranties. While discussing these to
a limited extent, this article is more concerned with the implied-in-law or "con-
structive" warranty and this is where the major emphasis will be placed. In con-
nection with the latter, it must be constantly borne in mind that it is not a
creature of contract at all but is based on an obligation which the law imposes,
regardless of the wishes of the producer, manufacturer, or vendor in the absence
of an express disclaimer."'
As the concept of express warranty developed, 4 precise words gradually
yielded to intention" and this, in turn, to the question of whether there had
been a promise or affirmation as to the character and quality of or title to the
goods. While at first it was thought that an intent to warrant was essential 8
31 Miller v. Penney, supra note 29, at 888; for other cases wherein actions were brought
for breach of warranties regarding animals see supra, note 24.
32 A typical and unfortunate example is contained in the opinion of the court in Hoch-
gertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
33 Infra IV. Implied warranties under the uniform statutes for cases dealing with disclaim-
er of liability; see especially Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1.
34 For an example of express warranty, see Mitchell v. Rudasill, supra note 22.
35 This development is similar to the early development in other fields of the common law
as, for example, in the case of instruments under seal. Referring to this, a New Jersey court has
said: "Words in early times, like form in a document or pleading were all important." Com-
menting on the difference in approach between the ancient and modem law, the court said:
"'The ancient land law imputed a thaumaturgic quality to language. If the judicial eye in
scanning the instrument chanced upon a pet phrase the inquiry was ended without resorting to
the arduous effort of reconciling evident inconsistencies therein. The universal touchstone today
is the intention of the parties to the instrument. . . .'" Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 26 N.J.
246, 139 A.2d 291 (1958), quoted in 4 WILLISTON, 'CONmACTS § 600A, at 291 (3d ed. Jaeger
1961).
36 Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T.R. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789); 1 WILLISTON, SALES §
198 (3d ed. 1948). In this case it was said, "an affirmation at the time of a sale is a warranty
provided it appears on evidence to have been so intended." See also Borrekins v. Bevan, 3
Rawle (Pa.) 23 (1831); McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts (Pa.) 55 (1839), where the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania expressed its regret that the rule of Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79
Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. 1625) should have been "swept away by a flood of innovation in England
and some of our sister States."
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this was eventually held unnecessary.r The distinction between express and im-
plied warranties has been well stated in a classic case: 38
Warranty may, but need not, be based on contract.
There can be no doubt now, of course, that a seller may
promise, in consideration of the purchase of goods from him, that
he will be answerable for their present, or, indeed, for their future
condition. Nor is it open to doubt that a seller who in terms war-
rants the goods which he sells thereby enters into such a contract.
But when a seller is held liable on a warranty for making an affirma-
tion of fact in regard to goods in order to induce their purchase, to
hold that such an affirmation is a contract is to speak the language
of pure fiction. It should not be the law and it is not the law that
a seller who by positive affirmation induces a buyer to enter into a
bargain can escape from liability by denying that his affirmation was
an offer to contract. A positive representation of fact is enough to
render him liable. The representation of fact which induces a bar-
gain is a warranty.3 9 In truth, the obligation imposed upon the seller
in such a case is imposed upon him not by virtue of his agreement to
assume it, but because of a rule of law applied irrespective of agree-
ment. The obligation in such a case is quasi contractual, and at least
if the seller knows the falsity of his representation there is also a
tort.
40
As to the constructive warranty in connection with the sale of food it has
been said:
1. In any case where a dealer sells articles of food for immediate human
consumption, the purchaser may rely upon an implied warranty that such articles
are wholesome and not deleterious, and in the event he sustains injuries from
consumption thereof, he may waive any tort there may have been and maintain
his cause of action upon such implied warranty.
2. Where articles of food for human consumption are manufactured or
packed by a manufacturer or packer and by a series of transactions reach'a retail
dealer who sells to the consumer, the manufacturer or packer, each intermediate
dealer, and the retail seller impliedly warrant that such articles of food are
wholesome and fit for immediate human consumption.4 '
A lesser, though growing number of jurisdictions recognize the existence
of a constructive warranty in cases which do not involve articles for human con-
sumption. Principal among these are decisions relating to products of mechanical
construction, any of which may have hidden defects threatening life or limb,
as will be seen from the subsequent discussion. 42
37 Ford Motor Co. v. Cullum, 96 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 627
(1938); Becker v. Sprowles, 310 Ky. 636, 220 S.W.2d 564 (1949); Adams v. Peter Tramontin
Motor Sales, Inc., 42 N.J. Super. 313, 126 A.2d 358 (1956); Jackson v. Gifford, 264 P.2d 313
(Okla. 1953); Kiddell v. Burnard, 152 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ex. 1842).
38 Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920).
39 Citing Foote v. Wilson Mercantile Co., 104 Kan. 191, 178 Pac. 430 (1919).
40 Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., supra note 38, quoting 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
1505 (Rev. ed. 1937).
41 Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930 (1938), quoted
with approval in Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953), where the court cites
and discusses many of these cases arising in Kansas, as well as those from other jurisdictions
including, inter alia, Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., supra note 38.
42 Infra III. Recent cases.
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Following the lead of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,4 and with
a similar determination to conform to the modern trend, the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia rejected privity as a requirement in an action for
breach of implied warranty, Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp.4 4
As in Henningsen, a defective steering mechanism on a new automobile was
responsible for the damage. When plaintiff sued the manufacturer and dealer,
defendant manufacturer moved to dismiss on the ground that there was no
privity of warranty; the trial court granted the motion and plaintiff appealed.
In a lucid and forward-looking opinion, Judge Myers cited many of the
leading precedents45 and effectively overruled the earlier jurisprudence of the
District."6 He stated the essential elements for recovery in actions for breach of
implied warranty:
There seems to be some confusion in understanding the nature
of implied warranty liability. In the first place, concepts of negli-
gence and fault, as defined by negligence standards, have no place
in warranty recovery cases. Proof of negligence is unnecessary to
liability for breach of implied warranty and the lack of it is imma-
terial to defense thereof. Since the warranty is implied, either in fact
or in law, no express representations or agreements by the manu-
facturer are needed. Implied warranty recovery is based upon two
factors: (a) The product or article in question has been transferred
from the manufacturer's possession while in a "defective" state, more
specifically, the product fails either to be "reasonably fit for the par-
ticular purpose intended" or of "merchantable quality," as these two
terms, separate but often overlapping, are defined by the law; and
(b) as a result of being "defective," the product causes personal in-
jury or property damage.47
III. THE EARLY CASES
One of the earliest precedents of note, Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co.,"'
43 Supra note 1.
44 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1962).
45 Such as Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 104, 119 (D. Hawaii 1961); Asher v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 Neb. 855, 112 N.W.2d 252, 255 (1961); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), 75 A.L.R.2d 1; Randy Knitwear, Inc. v.
American Cyanamid Company, supra note 2; Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 213 N.Y.S.2d
39, 173 N.E.2d 773 (1961); General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 414, 338 S.W.2d
655 (1960) (cert. denied Sup. Ct. Tenn.); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex.
609, 164 S.W.2d 828, 831 (1942), 142 A.L.R. 1479.
46 "We are aware that in this jurisdiction the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit decided in 1932 that 'according to the great weight of authority, a
manufacturer of food is not liable to third persons under an implied warranty, because there is
no privity of contract between them.' Connecticut Pie Co. v. Lynch, 61 App. D.C. 81, 57 F.2d
447 (1932). This ruling was followed in another food case, Hanback v. Dutch Baker Boy, Inc.,
70 App. D.C. 398, 107 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
"Ordinarily we would feel bound to apply this principle of law to the present case. How-
ever, from a study of recent decisions on the question of privity in implied warranty cases in-
volving food products as well as manufactured articles, we note that there is a distinct trend
to repudiate *this doctrine entirely. The more recent authorities, in cases involving both food
and defectively-manufactured products which would be dangerous to life or limb, have elimi-
nated the requirement of privity between the maker and the reasonably-expected ultimate con-
sumer or user and have ruled that, in keeping with modern methods of commerce and sales,
an implied warranty runs between the manufacturer or wholesaler and the consumer who buys
his product through a retail outlet. Three of the cases relied upon in Connecticut Pie Co. v.
Lynch, supra, have been overruled or modified." Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp.
supra, note 44, citing Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co. supra note 2.
47 Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra note 44.
48 14 Cal.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
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was decided in a jurisdiction which has since declared itself for absolute liability. 9
Having bought his wife a ham and cheese sandwich, the husband's consternation
(not to mention his spouse's disgust) may well be imagined when she bit into
the sandwich and found it "crawling with maggots and worms." When Mrs.
Klein brought this action, the manufacturer defended on the tried and rarely
found wanting ground of lack of privity. The Supreme Court of California refused
to entertain this defense and affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff. This decision
has since served as a persuasive precedent in any number of cases.5
But of even greater importance is Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps."1
None of the earlier cases was as definitive in its rejection of privity as a require-
ment for a breach of warranty action. Speaking through its Chief Justice, the
Supreme Court of Texas, without the slightest equivocation, grounded its de-
cision on considerations of public policy: Protection of the consumer is the prime
consideration. Here, a summer sausage, cervelat, encased in cellophane was
purchased from a retailer by Capps. Various members of the family partook of
the sausage, all became ill, and one died. When this action was brought against
the manufacturer, the jury found no negligence imputable to him. But, since the
sausage was obviously unfit for human consumption, as the injury and death
of those ingesting it tragically demonstrated, judgment for breach of warranty
was rendered for the plaintiffs by the trial court and affirned by the Court of
Civil Appeals.2
The Supreme Court reviewed the entire history of implied warranties ac-
companying the sale of food, traced its source to the early common law as far
back as 1266 A.D. and then observed "a growing tendency ... to discard the
requirement of privity and to hold the manufacturer liable directly to the ultimate
consumer." 3 The court continued:
After having considered the matter most carefully, we have
reached the conclusion that the manufacturer is liable for the in-
juries sustained by the consumers of the products in question. We
think the manufacturer is liable in such a case under an implied
warranty imposed by operation of law as a matter of public policy.
We recognize that the authorities are by no means uniform, but we
believe the better reasoning supports the rule which holds the manu-
facturer liable. Liability in such case is not based on negligence,
nor on a breach of the usual implied contractual warranty, but on
the broad principle of the public policy to protect human health and
life. It is a well-known fact that articles of food are manufactured
and placed in the channels of commerce, with the intention that they
49 California, see Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra note 2.
50 As, for example, Chapman v. Brown, supra note 2; Ruderman v. Warner-Lambert
Pharmaceutical Co., 23 Conn. Sup. 416, 184 A.2d 63 (1962); Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co.,
42 Cal.2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954); Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal.2d 339, 353 P.2d
575 (1960) ; Collumb v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 135 Cal. App.2d 653, 288 P.2d 75 (1955) ; Whit-
field v. Jessup, 31 Cal.2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948); Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 11
Cal. Rptr. 823 (1961); Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App.2d 18, 266 P.2d 163
(1954); Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 11.
There were earlier cases, and Parks v. G. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202(1914); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913) are among the earliest.
51 Supra, note 45.
52 The case is discussed in Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1
DUQUESNE U.L. Rav. 1 (1963).
53 Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 617, 164 S.W.2d 828, 832 (1942).
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shall pass from hand to hand until they are finally used by some
remote consumer. It is usually impracticable, if not impossible, for
the ultimate consumer to analyze the food and ascertain whether or
not it is suitable for human consumption. Since it has been packed
and placed on the market as a food for human consumption, and
marked as such, the purchaser usually eats it or causes it to be served
to his family without the precaution of having it analyzed by a
technician to ascertain whether or not it is suitable for human con-
sumption. In fact, in most instances the only satisfactory examina-
tion that could be made would be only at the time and place of the
processing of the food. It seems to be the rule that where food
products sold for human consumption are unfit for that purpose,
there is such an utter failure of the purpose for which the food is
sold, and the consequences of eating unsound food are so disastrous
to human health and life, that the law imposes a warranty of purity
in favor of the ultimate consumer as a matter of public policy."
A companion case, Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey,5 also decided in 1942
by the Supreme Court of Texas, held the, canning company liable to the ulti-
mate consumer. Plaintiff suffered from food poisoning caused by spinach which
had been sold in a sealed container. A much more recent case, Campbell Soup
Co. v. Ryan,"8 adds a modem touch. A "T-V Chicken Dinner" was purchased
by the plaintiff who, while eating it, was injured by a metal washer which was
concealed in the food. Relying on Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, the Court
of Civil Appeals, affirming judgment for plaintiff, emphasized that liability of a
manufacturer to the consumer of unhealthy food products "does not rest in
tort or contract in Texas, but upon a broad principle of public policy imposing
an obligation in the nature of an implied warranty to protect public health.""7
Pointing out that the Supreme Court of Texas had rejected the so-called require-
ment of privity, the appellate court added, "the rule that the implied warranty
'runs with the article' is logical and sound. The rationale of the decision [Capps]
is that the manufacturer expects the 'appearance of suitableness to continue
with the product until someone is induced to consume it as food.' "58
In an early case in Ohio, Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino 9 the plaintiff
bought a cake from a retail grocery store. Defendant baking company had
produced the cake which contained a needle, the cause of certain internal in-
juries. In the action which followed, based on the implied warranty of whole-
someness embodied in the contract of sale to the grocer, judgment was given
for plaintiff. The court used an interesting and rather appealing theory. It held
that the plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of the contract made between the
54 The opinion in the 'Capps case supra note 45 has been cited and quoted in a number of
cases such as Chapman v. Brown, supra note 2, Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
supra note 11 and Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 328 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
55 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942).
56 Supra, note 54.
57 Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 328 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
58 The suggestion that "the implied warranty 'runs with the article'" has been mentioned
in some other cases as, for example, Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., supra note 38; Anderson
v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W. 48 (1937); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss.
876, 111 So. 305 (1927); cf. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944), separate concurring opinion.
59 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
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baking company and the grocery store, including the warranty of wholesomeness
which had been breached by the vendor. Ohio has since adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code which incorporates this principle under the title "Third
Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied."6 The section reads:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or
who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not ex-
clude or limit the operation of this section.6'
In the comment to this section it is stated that while the members of the
family, household, and guests of the purchaser are expressly included, beyond
this, "the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the develop-
ing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells,
extend to other persons in the distributive chain."6 2
A few years ago, in Glanzer v. Shepard," the New York Court of Appeals
had intimated that the third party beneficiary doctrine, as originally postulated
in Lawrence v. Fox," might be applicable to such situations. This view has been
strongly endorsed by a leading authority on the law of contracts and sales.65
Professor Wiliston has said:
And if the test of "intent to benefit" is applied, it must be quite
clear that buying food for consumption by another is rather gener-
ally, criminal intent being absent, intended to have beneficent results.
Nor should the sale of food be accompanied by any other intent.66
It seems curious that where third party beneficiaries have been
recognized for so many decades in so many fields, there should be
so much-reluctance to recognize them in their most important as-
pect; ofttimes, in a matter of life or death.67
A similar development allowing the ultimate consumer to recover even in
the absence of privity developed in connection with various bottled beverages.
Most of the cases involve actions for injuries caused by the presence of foreign
deleterious substances in a carbonated beverage. Very often, a dead mouse is
60 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318.
61 Jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code are listed supra, note 3.
62 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, comment 3; this should give the more progres-
sive jurisdictions ample opportunity for the exercise of judicial discretion. Certainly, as the Court
of Appeals of New York points out in Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 2, what law judges have
made (especially by way of obiter dictum) can be unmade or corrected when inequity results
by the courts themselves without the aid of legislative intervention. But see: Hochgertel v.
Canada Dry Corp., supra note 12. Sullivan v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 341 Mass. 216, 168
N.E.2d 80 (1960).
A wholesale dealer of a stepladder was not liable under this section for breach of warranty,
in an action brought by an employee of one who purchased the stepladder from a retail dealer,
for injuries sustained by the employee when the stepladder collapsed, because even if the em-
ployee were considered a member of the buyer's household, she could proceed only against the
retail seller, with whom the buyer was in privity, and not against the remote vendor. Kacz-
markiewicz v. J. A. Williams Co., 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 14 (C.P. of Allegheny County, 1957), 106
Pittsb. Leg. J. 1.
63 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275, quoted with approval in Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 13 Misc.2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958) ; Glanzer is analyzed in Amer-
ican Casualty Co. v. Memorial Hospital Assn., 223 F.Supp. 539 (E.D. Wis. 1963).
64 20 N.Y. 268 (1859); JAEGER, LAW OF CONTRACTS 338 (1953, Supp., 1964).
65 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 378A (3d ed. Jaeger 1959).
66 As to the "intent to benefit" test, see the discussion in op. cit. supra note 65, at §§ 356,
and especially 356A, notes 2-6, pp. 835-37.
67 Id. at 976; quoted in Jaeger, 1 DUQUESNE U.L. REv. 1, 59-60.
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the offender. 8 However, insects and other vermin run a close second. 9 Tobacco
products, such as cigar stubs or cigarette butts, 70 acids,7 1 and many other noxious
items, such as particles of glass,72 have been found in beverages marketed for
human consumption, and the cases dealing with them are legion.73 Contrary to
68 Gray v. Pet Milk Co., 108 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 688; Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of Puerto Rico v. Negron Torres 255 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958); Bellingrath
v. Anderson, 203 Ala. 62, 82 So. 22 (1919); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Barksdale, 17 Ala. App.
606, 88 So. 36 (1920); Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Ezzell, 22 Ala. App. 210, 114 So.
278 (1927); Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P.2d 162 (1933); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Davidson, 193 Ark. 825, 102 S.W.2d 833 (1937); Hope Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jones, 222
Ark. 52, 257 S.W.2d 272 (1953); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Misenheiner, 222 Ark. 581, 261
S.W.2d 775 (1953); Moss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 103 Cal. App.2d 380, 229 P.2d 802
(Dist. Ct. App. 1951); Martin v. Waycross Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 18 Ga. App. 226, 89 S.E.495
(1916); Duvall v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 329 I1. App. 290, 68 N.E.2d 479 (1946); Jackson
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 (1914); Blount v. Houston Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 184 Miss. 69, 185 So. 241 (1939); Norman v. Jefferson City Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 211 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. App. 1948); Trembley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285
App. Div. 539, 138 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1955); Tate v. Mauldin, 157 S.C. 392, 154 S.E. 431
(1930); Amarillo Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Loudder, 207 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
69 Cockroaches: Whited v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 88 Ga. App. 241, 76 S.E.2d
408 (1953); Laborde v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 15 So.2d 389 (La. App. 1943);
Coast Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Bryant, 236 Miss. 880, 112 So.2d 538 (1929); Oklahoma Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Dillard, 208 Okla. 126, 253 P.2d 847 (1953); Caines v. Marion Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 198 S.C. 204, 17 S.E.2d 315 (1941); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Smith, 97 S.W.2d
761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Heckman, 113 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938).
Spiders: Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Smith, 29 Ala. App. 324, 195 So. 560 (1940);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Eudy, 193 Ark. 436, 100 S.W.2d 683 (1937); Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Morrison, 194 Ark. 248, 106 S.W.2d 601 (1937); Hollis v. Ouachita Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 196 So. 376 (La. App. 1940); Smith v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 152 Pa. Super. 445, 33
A.2d 488 (1943).
Worms: Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Atl. 537 (1931);
Peters v. Double Coca Bottling Co., 224 S.C. 437, 79 S.E.2d 710 (1954); Norfolk Coca-Cola
Bottling Works v. Land, 189 Va. 35, 52 S.E.2d 85 (1949); Parr v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works,
121 W. Va. 314, 3 S.E.2d 499 (1939).
Other Vermin: Whistle Bottling Co. v. Searson, 207 Ala. 387, 92 So. 657 (1922); Dr.
Pepper Co. v. Brittain, 234 Ala. 548, 176 So. 286 (1937); Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Swilling, 186 Ark. 1149,
57 S.W.2d 1029 (1933); Anheuser-Busch v. Southard, 191 Ark. 107, 84 S.W.2d 89 (1935);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cromwell, 203 Ark. 933, 159 S.W.2d 744 (1942); Rowton v. Ruston
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 17 So.2d 851 (La. App. 1944); Ferguson v. Parr, 85 So.2d 117 (La.
App. 1955); Tafoya v. Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 59 N.M. 43, 278 P.2d 575 (1955);
Peters v. Double Coca Bottling Co., 224 S.C. 437, 79 S.E.2d 710 (1954).
70 Try-Me Beverage Co. v. Harris, 217 Ala. 302, 116 So. 147 (1928); Macon Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Chancey, 216 Ga. 61, 114 S.E.2d 517 (1960); Sheenan v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 41 N.J. Super. 213, 124 A.2d 319 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956); Keller v. Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co., 214 Or. 654, 330 P.2d 346 (1958); Boyd v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn.
23, 177 S.W. 80 (1915); Von Herr v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 148 So. 75 (La. App.
1933); cf. Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Watford, 31 Ala. App. 493, 19 So.2d 77 (1944).
71 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Munn, 99 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1938); Slaughter v. Atlanta
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 48 Ga. App. 327, 172 S.E. 723 (1934); Laurel Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Hankins, 222 Miss. 297, 75 So.2d 731 (1954); Evans v. Charlotte Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.,
216 N.C. 716, 6 S.E.2d 510 (1940); Caskie v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 373 Pa. 614, 96
A.2d 901 (1953).
72 Albany Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shiver, 63 Ga. App. 755, 12 S.E.2d 114 (1940); King
v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 151 So. 252 (La. App. 1933); Gunter v. Alexandria Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 197 So. 159 (La. App. 1940); Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Grubbs,
143 Miss..590, 108 So. 732 (1926); Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25
A.2d 125 (1942); Manning v. Harvey C. Hines Co., 218 N.C. 779, 10 S.E.2d 727 (1940).
73 Fisher v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 66 App. D.C. 7, 84 F.2d 261
(D.C. Cir. 1936); Opelika Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McEachern, 242 Ala. 628, 7 So.2d 570
(1942) Medeiros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 57 Cal. App.2d 707, 135 P.2d 676 (1943); East
Kentucky Beverage Co. v. Stumbo, 313 Ky. 66, 230 S.W.2d 106 (1950); Basile v. World Bot-
tling Co., 17 So.2d 734 (La. App. 1944); Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 263
Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d 918 (1961); Rupy v. George Schneider & Co., 286 App. Div. 1095,
145 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1955); Murray v. Ballantine & Sons, 75 R.I. 13, 62 A.2d 895, 63 A.2d 730
(1948). See also cases cited notes 68-72 supra.
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the great majority of jurisdictions, a few still adhere to the archaic and pernicious
doctrine of privity.74 However, the present situation has been well summarized in
a leading case: 7 "In state courts, requirement of privity has been generally
abandoned in food product actions based upon implied warranty violations
where the food products are shown to be in the same condition as when they
left the control of the manufacturer." 6
IV. THE RECENT CASES
Food
Of the recent cases dealing with food none has been found which is more
comprehensive in its treatment of the rights of the ultimate consumer who has
been injured by noxious food products than Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Company." Here, Judge Starke, in a masterful opinion deals a lethal blow to
privity. He surveys the various theories, fictions and exceptions which the
courts have employed to afford a remedy to the injured consumer confronted
with the defense of lack of privity. In the Parish case, a jar of jam was pur-
chased by the mother of two infant daughters. When the latter began to partake
of the jam, they found worms in it and became ill.
When this action was brought on behalf of the infants, the expected defense,
lack of privity, was interposed. But this time, Judge Starke, who had become
convinced of the inequities of this defense by the facts in an earlier case which
he had adjudicated, Conklin v. Hotel Waldorf Astoria Corp.,"' was ready to
demolish it with a powerful attack. The court examined the question under
various headings. Analyzing the "New York trend," Judge Starke concluded
that it pointed the way towards the forthright abolition of the so-called privity
74 Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921); Smith
v. Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942); Soter v. Griesedieck
Western Brewery Co., 200 Okla. 302, 193 P.2d 575 (1948).
75 Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra note 2.
76 In some jurisdictions as, for example, Connecticut, Georgia and Virginia, the privity
requirement has been expressly eliminated in certain situations by statute; and as has been noted
above, the Uniform Commercial Code has introduced certain departures from the privity con-
cept in § 2-318.
77 13 Misc.2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958).
78 Such as the agency theory, the conduit exception, "warranty running with the goods," a
general offer of warranty made when the manufacturer advertises his product extensively;
privity deemed constructively present when the consumer is a subpurchaser within the distribu-
tive chain or conduit; public policy.
79 5 Misc.2d 496, 161 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1957); Judge Starke while sitting in Parish v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 13 Misc.2d 33, 35, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7, 10 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958)
wrote:
This Court was greatly disturbed by the inanity of the strict application of
the privity doctrine when the subject arose in the Conklin case, supra. As a
result, the Waldorf case represents the first direct and concentrated judicial
attack in New York upon the citadel of privity. The Court was roused into
investigating the entire privity problem far beyond the precise question in the
case, and made an exhaustive research and study of the subject. That which
went beyond the decisional need for the Waldorf case was submitted in the
form of Articles to the New York Law Journal and appeared in its editorial
columns on April 8, 9, 10, 1957. The Articles reviewed the modern trend,
aspect and approach by courts in this state and other states, with emphasis
on the non-purchaser consumer's rights against the manufacturer as well as
the dealer, for breach of warranty rather than in negligence .... It is hoped
that, because the privity problem is of vital concern, the higher courts will
clarify the legal atmosphere clouding the subject. As Lord Mansfield said:
"Lawyers and litigants are entitled to know where they stand as to what
their rights are and what the law is."
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requirement."0 Subsequent events have completely vindicated the soundness of
his judgment. The New York trilogy, 1 culminating in Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp.,"2 lead inevitably to the conclusion that privity has been de-
finitely obliterated from New York Law.8
The court then surveys two other theories used by the courts to set at naught
the defense of privity: (1) Agency, and (2), the third party beneficiary doctrine.
Under agency, four well-known cases, Ryan v. Progressive Stores, Inc.,84
Bowman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company,' Mouren v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Company,86 and Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading CorpY were dis-
cussed. The court simply held that where a member of the household purchased
the food, he was acting as agent for the other members of the family.8 Of
course, this is subject to the inevitable question: What happens if the purchaser
is not really the agent of the injured consumer? Under those circumstances, it
may be necessary to rely on the third party beneficiary doctrine discussed above.8"
Under the rubric "Historical Background and Error," the court directs at-
tention to the mixed or hybrid nature of actions for breach of warranty stating
that "it is actually sui juris, a combined tort and contract action - commencing
in contract and resulting in tort where the seller has violated his obligation and
the tacit representation that the food is wholesome. The warranty is imposed
by law, in the name of public health and public policy, and not because of any
express or implied-in-fact understanding of the parties."9
"Historically, there is no justification for the notion that privity of contract
is essential to support an action for breach of an implied warranty." 1
A familiar argument thoroughly disposed of by the lucid reasoning of the
80 Since the opinion in the Parish case was written, Judge Starke's hope has been fully
realized by the decisions of the New York Court of Appeals in Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note
2, and Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d. 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963), the
latter of which took the final step towards consigning privity to a well-deserved and long over-
due limbo.
81 Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 2, Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,
11 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962), and Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., supra
note 80.
82 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
83 The lower courts in New York have followed Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
supra note 80; to this effect see Williams v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 App. Div.2d 661, 230
N.Y.S.2d 476 (1962); Simpson v. Eichenbrunner, 31 Misc.2d 958, 217 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1961);
50 New Walden, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 39 Misc.2d 460, 241 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1963).
84 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
85 284 App. Div. 663, 133 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1954).
86 1 N.Y.2d 884, 154 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1956).
87 265 App. Div. 278, 38 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1942).
88 "In Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 265 App. Div. 278, 38 N.Y.S.2d
788, the Appellate Division, 1st Dept., stated the petitioner * * * might be
in a position to show the son who purchased the crabmneat was acting simply
as his agent in making the purchase and that the cause of action accrued to
the father, relying on Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175
N.E. 105, 74 A.L.R. 339, and sent the case back for a new trial. In the
Ryan case, the Court sustained the verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The first
paragraph of the opinion reads as follows: 'Plaintiff, through his wife, who
acted as his agent, bought a loaf of bread at the defendant's grocery. The
loaf had concealed in it a pin, which hurt the plaintiff's mouth."' Parish v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 13 Misc.2d 33, 41, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7, 15(Munic. Ct. 1958), quoting from Mouren v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 139 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
89 Supra, notes 60 et seq.
90 Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 79, at 16. (Emphasis added.)
91 Here, the court continued: "Originally the remedy for breach of such warranty was an
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court is that legislative action is necessary if privity is to be eliminated. 92 Dis-
cussing with approval the early case of Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co.,9" here-
tofore considered,94 the court finds that the pertinent sections of the statutes in
effect in California and New York imposing the pertinent warranties are iden-
tical.9" Since the California court had found in the Klein case that the intention
of the legislature was to include consumers within the ambit of the warranties
enacted for their protection, the New York court could find no valid reason for
supposing that the intent of the New York legislature was any different.9
Finally, the court evaluates the public policy factor.97 Consumer protection, urges
Judge Starke, is a cogent reason for the elimination of the privity requirement:
The rule limiting the right to recover for breach of an implied
warranty in the sale of foodstuffs to those in privity with the seller,
being obviously technical, and shown to be historically unsound,
has created dissatisfaction in the legal profession with the result that
it has been repeatedly criticized.93
Great dissatisfaction with the strict privity doctrine has been
frequently expressed by modem legal educators and writers.99 They
view the problem as essentially an enterprise liability, and that the
ultimate consumer in food cases should not only have the right of
suing the retailer for breach of warranty but should also have that
right against the manufacturer as the guarantor of the fitness and
wholesomeness of its product when it is used for the purpose and in
the manner intended. In no other way, they argue, can a fair and
action on the case for breach of an assumed duty, a tort action in the nature of deceit but in
which scienter or intent to deceive did not have to be alleged. Warranty was viewed as a
form of misrepresentation and the gravamen of the action was the warranty and not conscious
deception.... " Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 13 Misc.2d 33, 42, 177 N.Y.S.2d
7, 17 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958).
92 This is suggested in a concurring opinion in Greenberg v.. Lorenz, supra note 2 and in
Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 12.
93 Supra note 11.
94 Supra p. 510.
95 Uniform Sales Act § 15 was in effect in both jurisdictions at the time. It has since been
superseded by the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-315.
Of Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., the Court said: "The intention of the legislature was
discussed in the thoroughly illuminating, educational and convincing decision by a California
court (where their Sec. 1735 WEsT's ANN. CIVIL CODE, is absolutely identical with our Sec. 96,
Personal Property Law, Sub. 1), in Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 1939, 14 Cal.2d 272, 93
P.2d 799, 804 (1938)" at 23.
96 The court finds this argument persuasive in Chapman v. Brown, supra note 2.
97 This was the controlling factor in Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, supra note 11,
Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942), and Campbell Soup Co.
v. Ryan, 328 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (inter alia).
98 Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 79, citing at 33: 7 CAL. L. REv.
360 (1919); 23 CAL. L. REV. 621 (1935); 33 COL. L. Rv. 868 (1933); 1 DurE UNIV., Law
and Contemporary Problems of the School of Laws 1 (1933); 4 FORDHAm L. REv. 295
(1935); 34 HARV. L. REv. 762 (1921); 42 HAv. L. REv. 414 (1929); 30 ILL. L. REV. 398
(1935); 5 IOWA L. BULL. 86 (1919); 29 MICH. L. REV. 906 (1931); 9 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv.
360, 366 (1932); 4 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 80 (1929); 9 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 216 (1934); 27
YALE L.J. 1068 (1918); 29 YALE L.J. 782 (1920); VOLD, SALES 476 (1st. ed. 1931).
99 Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees,
45 L.Q. REV. 343 (1929); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Condon, Progress of Products Liability Law, 31 N.Y.S. B.
BULL. 119 (1959); Ehrensweig, Products Liability In the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 794
(1960); Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors, 10 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1925);
Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 MINN. L. REv. 752 (1935); Fricke, Personal In-
jury Damages in Products Liability, 6 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1960); Gllam, Products Liability in
a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119 (1958); Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Prod-
ucts Be Liable Without Negligence? 24 TENN. L. REV. 928 (1957); Hotes, Advertised-Product
Liability: Viewpoint of the Consumer, 8 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 81 (1959); Jaeger, Privity of
Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 DUQUESNE, U.L. REv. 1 (1963); Jaeger, Warranties of
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reasonable measure of security be obtained for the public at large.
Courts throughout the land have endeavored to extend the buyer's
protection under classic warranty law to the non-buyer consumer by
either abandoning or liberally construing the privity requirement,
some being on "public policy," some on "breach of duty," others
on "social justice," and still others on the third party beneficiary
rule.10" Again, it is the food cases with their constant stress upon the
promotion of public health which have led the way." 1
In Greenberg v. Lorenz,'0° the Court of Appeals of New York was con-
fronted with a situation similiar to that in the Parish case. The father of the
injured infant had purchased a can of salmon containing a metal tag which
caused the damage. Although the trial court entered judgment for the infant
plaintiff, refusing to accept the defense of privity of warranty, the Appellate
Division reversed, holding that without strict privity there could be no recovery,
following the early cases of Chysky v. Drake Brothers,... and Salzano v. First
National Stores."'4 Motion for leave to appeal to the high court of New York
having been granted, the latter reversed the Appellate Division, commenting:'
Our difficulty is not in finding the applicable rule but in deciding
whether or not to change it. The decisions are clear enough. There
can be no warranty, express or implied, without privity of con-
tract .... '0 The unfairness of the restriction has been argued in
writings so numerous as to make a lengthy bibliography. .... 0"
About 20 States have abolished such requirements of privity the
latest being Virginia and New Jersey.
The court then cited Swift & Co. v. Wells'" and Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Merchantability and Fitness for Use: Recent Developments, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 493 (1962);
James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence? 24 TENN. L.
REV. 923 (1957); James, The Liability of Manufacturers for Faulty Goods, 1960 J. Bus. L.
287; Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees,
24 VA. L. REV. 134 (1937); Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA.
L. REV. 122 (1961); Lucey, Liability Without Fault and the Natural Law, 24 TENN. L. REV.
952 (1957); Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Fore-
sight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961) ; Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50 A.B.A.J. 446 (1964);
Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV. 963
(1957); Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products, 24
TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957); Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27
MINN. L. REV. 117 (1943); Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability To The
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Russell, Manufacturers' Liability to the Ultimate Con-
sumer, 21 Ky. L.J. 388 (1933); Ruud, Manufacturers' Liability for Representations Made by
Their Sales Engineers to Subpurchasers, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 251 (1961); Skeel, Advertised-
Product Liability: Nature of the Problem-What is "Warranty"? 8 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REV. 2
(1959); Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery on Warranty, 19 N.C.L. REV.
551 (1941); Willis, Product Liability Without Fault: Some Problems and Proposals, 15 FooD,
DRUG, Cosm. L. J. 648 (1960); Wilson, Products Liability, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 614 (1955).
A comprehensive bibliography on products liability has been published in 7- No. 5 THE
PRAC. LAW. 70 (1961).
100 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 378A (3d ed. Jaeger, 1959) which recommends the use of
this means to enable consumers as beneficiaries of the contracts of sale of foodstuffs and similar
items to recover for injuries suffered by the consumption of these products where privity is
lacking.
Supra notes 60 et seq.
101 Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 79; numerous authorities and
cases cited by the court are omitted.
102 9 N.Y.2d 195, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 173 N.E.2d 773 (1961).
103 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
104 268 App. Div. 993, 51 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1944).
105 Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 102, at 198-99.
106 The court cited the articles which Judge Starke published in the New York Law Journal
of April 8, 9, and 10, 1957; a part of this "lengthy bibliography" is listed supra notes 98 and 99.
107 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959).
PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CONSTRUCTIVE WARRANTY 519
Motors, Inc.' as illustrative of the latest defections from the ranks of the
jurisdictions requiring strict privity. The Court of Appeals concluded:
The injustice of denying damages to a child because of non-
privity seems too plain for argument. The only real doubt is as to
the propriety of changing the rule.... But the present rule which
we are being asked to modify is itself of judicial making since our
statutes say nothing at all about privity and in early times such liabil-
ities were thought to be in tort. Alteration of the law in such matters
has been the business of the New York courts for many years. .... 10D
To decide the case before us, we should hold that the infant's
cause of action should not have been dismissed solely on the ground
that the food was purchased not by the child but by the child's father.
Today when so much of our food is bought in packages it is not just
or sensible to confine the warranty's protection to the individual
buyer. At least as to food and household goods, the presumption
should be that the purchase was made for all the members of the
household.110
One judge, while concurring in the unanimous decision of the court, felt
constrained to bring forth a timeworn argument in his concurring opinion:
"However much one may think liability should be broadened, that must be left
to the Legislature."' 11 Substantially the same argument appears in Hochgertel
v. Canada Dry Corp." and substantially the same refutation may be made to
108 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
109 Citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Ultra-
mares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
110 Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 102, at 199-200; the court's estimate of "about twenty
states" has certainly been augmented in the past three years.
111 The concurring opinion continues:
There are two sides to the problem before us-and one of them is the plight
of the seller. It is just as unfair to hold liable a retail groceryman, as here,
who is innocent of any negligence or wrong, on the theory of breach of war-
rarty, for some defect in a canned product which he could not inspect and
with the production of which he had nothing to do, as it is to deny relief to
one who has no relationship to the contract of purchase and sale, though eat-
ing at the purchaser's table....
It is for the Legislature to determine the policy of accommodating those
conflicting interests after affording all concerned an opportunity to be heard.
Indeed, the Legislature has not been unaware of the problem for, in three
separate years-1943, 1945, 1959-as noted by the Chief Judge, the New
York State Law Revision Commission recommended that the benefits of im-
plied warranties to be extended to the buyer's employees and to the members
of his household, but the Legislature has declined to act, despite the intro-
duction of legislation. I do not think we should now assume their powers
and change the rules, which will undoubtedly affect many cases in which law-
yers and litigants understood the law to be otherwise, and governed them-
selves accordingly. Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 102, at 201.
It is submitted that the foregoing argument that any change should be left to the legis-
lature does not take into consideration that the privity requirement was originally judge-made,
as the principal opinion emphasizes, and certainly, if the Supreme Court of New Jersey could
decide that under certain circumstances privity was unnecessary, there seems no cogent reason
why the high court of New York could not do the same in an increasing number of situations
where public policy might require it. Also, as to the plight of the retailer: He may seek recov-
ery from the manufacturer or canner whose products he selected in the first place and thereby
set in motion the entire train of events, culminating in the consumer's injury. It may tend to
induce him to be more careful in the selection of the foods he offers for sale and of the manu-
facturers and food processors upon whom he bestows his patronage, as suggested by the court in
Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., 157 Me. 10, 170 A.2d 160 (1961).
112 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963); the Hochgertel case is discussed in considerable
detail and the majority opinion criticized in Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin
Sounded? 1 DuQunsNn U.L. Rav. 1, 3, 20-24 (1963).
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the effect that this was originally judge-made obiter dictum "law,""' namely
that "alteration of the law in such matters," as Chief Judge Desmond declared
in the principal opinion, "has been the business of the New York courts for many
"1114years.
Before leaving the subject of food, three very recent cases will be considered.
In the first, Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co.,"s the Supreme Court of Maine,
speaking through Chief Justice Williamson, made a careful and exhaustive analysis
of the effect the Uniform Sales Acte16 had upon the doctrine of privity in that
jurisdiction. His opinion must be included among the lucid and most significant
that have been rendered in several decades. The facts showed that the plaintiff
had purchased certain sausages contained in a sealed plastic bag. When he ate
the sausages, particles of glass injured his gums, and the consumer brought this
action.
After a comprehensive review of the leading precedents,"' the court held
that the implied warranty of merchantable quality had been breached and
plaintiff was entitled to recover." 8
113 Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 102; the obiter dicta (there were two) in Winterbottom
v. Wright, 10 Mees & W. 109, 11 L.J. Ex. 415, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), are quoted
supra note 13.
114 Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 102, at 200. In Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., supra note 79, at 22, Judge Starke, after analyzing and interpreting the statutory language
of the sales law found applicable, disposes of the suggestion or contention that the legislature
must act:
There is absolutely no need for legislative change because it never could
have been the intention of the legislature to deprive an infant of the war-
ranty right simply because the mother purchased the goods.
The words "reasonably fit for such purpose" means that the goods are
fit "for the purpose for which they are sold and bought." . .. [T]he ordinary
purpose for which a housewife purchases foodstuffs is-for human consump-
tion--"domestic meals" and household table use...
Ordinary "household table use" and "domestic meals" contemplates
consumption by the non-buyer consumer, whether he be an infant, husband,
or even a friend or relative who has been invited as a guest to partake of a
meal.
115 Supra note 111.
116 Section 15, adopted in Maine to be effective in 1923, see ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch.
185, §§ 1-78 (1954) (repealed by Me. Public Laws 1963, ch. 362, § 34, effective Dec. 31,
1964).
117 As, for example, Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105
(1931); Botti v. Venice Grocery Co., 309 Mass. 450, 35 N.E.2d 491 (1941); Mead v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440, 108 N.E.2d 757 (1952); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., supra note 1.
118 In the course of its opinion, at 165, the Supreme Court concluded that by the great
weight of authority, there is no "sealed container exception," citing the following cases in sup-
port:
Jackson v. Watson & Sons (1909), 2 K.B. 193, 16 Am. & Eng. Annot.
cases 492; Martin v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 301 Ky. 429, 192
S.W.2d 201 (changing sealed container rule under Kentucky common law);
Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225
(1918); D'Onofrio v. First National Stores, Inc., 68 R.I. 144, 26 A.2d 758
(1942); Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Ad. 385, 90
A.L.R. 1260 and Annotation; Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman et al., 57 Ohio App.
190, 13 N.E.2d 130.
The court also took occasion to disapprove specifically a precedent of fifty years' stand-
ing, Bigelow v. Maine Central R.R., 110 Me. 105, 85 Atl. 396 (1912), wherein food served
at a restaurant (dining car) was held not a sale and the unhappy traveler who suffered food
poisoning from the meals eaten there would have to prove negligence. Now, he would be the
beneficiary of an implied warranty of wholesomeness; cf. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314
where such service is expressly declared a sale.
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The second case, Gonzales v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,11" presents a situation
where, on the patriotic occasion of Washington's birthday, a wife unwittingly
served her husband peas which were inedible by virtue of the presence of certain
"bugs." She had purchased the canned peas (which were labelled "A Safeway
Guaranteed Product") from defendant. During dinner, the husband, after eating
some of the peas, found a "bug" among them. He became nauseated and vomited
for three days. The Supreme Court of Colorado, citing Griggs Canning Company
v. Josey," ° reversed the trial court which had granted defendant's motion to
dismiss. Apparently, the Court did not consider lack of privity (the wife had
purchased the peas) a bar to the husband's recovery of judgment since privity
was not even mentioned."±
Gilbert v. John Gendusa Bakery, Inc.22 is the third and final case to be
considered here. A homely product, jelly doughnuts, were the subject of the sale
which resulted in this litigation. It seems the doughnuts contained "small black
insects." Plaintiff's infant son, while eating the doughnuts, which had been sold
in a sealed glasine bag bearing defendant's label, discovered the insects, showed
them to his mother and then became acutely ill. He was taken to the doctor who
administered an anti-emetic. The following day he suffered "acute gastro-enteritis,
diarrhea, abdominal pains, nausea and vomiting."
In his action, the plaintiff alleged that the warranty "of purity and whole-
someness" had been breached and judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff.
Affirming, the appellate court stated the law:
We feel that the plaintiff proved his case by a convincing pre-
ponderance of evidence and should prevail in this action. In cases
of this type, the manufacturer and the vendor of foodstuff designed
for human consumption, both, are virtually insurers that such mer-
chandise is pure, wholesome and free from foreign materials and
deleterious substances. We find that there was a breach of implied
warranty that these doughnuts were wholesome and fit for human
consumption.12 3
Beverages
Any number of cases have arisen in connection with the presence of noxious
foreign substances in beverages. Kansas was one of the earliest jurisdictions which
held that the liability of the manufacturer or bottler was absolute, being based
on considerations of public policy as a federal appellate court accurately con-
cluded from the available Kansas precedents:
124
Under the law of Kansas an implied warranty is not contractual.
It is an obligation raised by law as an inference from the acts of
the parties or the circumstances of the transaction and it is created
119 147 Col. 358, 363 P.2d 667 (1961).
120 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942).
121 This would seem to indicate that Colorado has aligned itself with the jurisdictions
which have discarded privity as a requirement in breach of warranty actions where food prod-
ucts are involved. These jurisdictions now represent a substantially preponderant majority of
the United States.
122 144 So.2d 760 (La. App. 1962).
123 Citing MacLehan v. Loft Candy Stores, 172 So. 367 (La. App. 1937); the court also
quotes extensively from Ogden v. Rosedale Inn, 189 So. 162 (La. App. 1939).
124 Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc.,
176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
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by operation of law and does not arise from any agreement in fact
of the parties. The Kansas decisions are in accord with the general
rule laid down in the adjudicated cases. And under the Kansas
decisions privity is not essential where an implied warranty is im-
posed by the law on the basis of public policy.1 25
This statement of the public policy of Kansas was later quoted with ap-
proval by the Supreme Court of that jurisdiction in Rupp v. Norton Coca-Cola
Bottling Company, Inc. 2 This case and its companion, Connell v. Norton
Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc.,' presented the same factual situation:
Two sisters visited their mother, a patient in the Norton County Hospital. During
their stay at the hospital, they purchased a bottle of Coca-Cola from a vending
machine in the waiting room. After opening the bottle, one of the sisters began
to drink its contents and noticed a peculiar taste. The other sister took a swallow
and also noticed that there was something unnatural about the flavor of the
beverage. After each had taken two or three more sips, a large decomposed
centipede became noticeable in the bottom of the bottle. Both plaintiffs became
nauseated and suffered severe vomiting spells. They were attended by a physician
but continued to suffer nausea and vomiting. At the trial, medical testimony in-
dicated that this condition might continue for some time and was the result of
seeing the centipede in the bottle. The trial court rendered judgment for plain-
tiffs, and the Supreme Court affirmed, quoting the earlier classic, Cernes v. Pitts-
burg Coca-Cola Bottling Company:"1 2
It may be stated as a general rule of this court that where
beverage is manufactured and bottled for immediate human con-
sumption and by a series of transactions reaches a retail dealer who
sells to the consumer, the manufacturer or bottler impliedly warrants
such beverage is wholesome and fit for immediate human consump-
tion. Moreover, the manufacturer or bottler must know the beverage
is fit or take the consequences if it proves injurious. Where he
places such bottled beverage in the hands of a dealer for sale, the
manufacturer is responsible for damages to the consumer, who pro-
125 B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959). It seems curious
that the year before the United States Court of Appeals, in Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263
F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1958) had declared that "implied warranties, in the absence of privity, are
restricted in Kansas to food and beverage products, glass containers of beverages, and hair dye,"
at 319. It would appear that the later decision in Hammond is compatible with the progressive
trend of the times.
In the latter case, the contract had been made in Missouri and the fatal accident involving
the blowout of Goodrich Premium Lifeguard tires (the subject of the sale), occurred in Kansas,
so the federal court considered the jurisprudence of each and found that the highest court in
Missouri had not spoken:
It is true that the Missouri decision is by an intermediate court of
appeals. However, where jurisdiction rests solely on diversity of citizenship
and there is no controlling decision by the highest court of a state, a decision
by an intermediate court should be followed by the Federal court, absent, as
here, of convincing evidence that the highest court of the state would decide
otherwise. 269 F.2d 501, 506.
It is reassuring to note the accuracy of the Tenth Circuit's prognosis; the Supreme Court
of Missouri in Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (1963), confirmed the
federal court's Erie-educated guess and pronounced privity of warranty dead on arrival, citing
with approval Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 DUQUEsNE U.L. Ruv.
1, especially the conclusions stated at 141-42.
126 187 Kan. 390, 357 P.2d 802 (1960).
127 187 Kan. 393, 357 P.2d 804 (1960).
128 183 Kan. 758, 332 P.2d 258 (1958).
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cures such beverage from the dealer and is injured by partaking
of it."29
Our decisions further hold that a manufacturer or bottler of
food or beverage for human consumption is in effect an insurer
that such food or drink will cause no harmful effects because of dele-
terious matter therein. The basis for imposing this liability is a
matter of public policy for the protection of the people, as discussed
in many of our cases.' 30
In Keller v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,"' a case of novel impression in Oregon,
many of the principal authorities and precedents are reviewed, including Le
Blanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,"' Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Todd,"3' Jordan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Utah,"' Wichita Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Tyler,"' and one of the great classics of all time, Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno."' The court rejected the suggestion that the cigar
stub contained in the bottle was the result of tampering and affirmed the judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff. As the court observed, "in this case, as well as in every
other one we have examined, there has been no evidence that tampering by
competitors or busybodies was an actual probability. The only indication is the
contention that the opportunity or possibility existed. This is not sufficient to
establish such a probability as matter of law, as defendant requests us to do."" 7
A very usual situation in connection with beverages is presented by the ex-
ploding or breaking bottle. A typical case, with unfortunate results for the plain-
tiff, is Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp."' George Hochgertel was a bartender
in a fraternal club and was injured by flying glass when an unopened soda water
bottle exploded while standing on a counter behind the bar. When this action was
brought, preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer were sustained by
the trial court and Hochgertel appealed. Instead of seizing the opportunity for
advancing the interests of the consuming public the court adhered to the archaic
and worn-out notion of privity and sustained the trial court's decision declaring
that Hochgertel as an employee of the club where he worked did not come within
the protection of the warranty. The court limited the operation of the implied
warranty, without distinguishing between implied-in-fact warranties and con-
129 Citing Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 633 (1957);
Sharp v. Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 180 Kan. 845, 308 P.2d 150 (1957); and cases
cited therein.
130 Connell v. Norton Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 127, at 807, quoting from Cernes
v. Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 128, at 261-62, where the court added:
"Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridged, Second Edition,
defines 'wholesome' as promoting mental health or well-being, or physical
well-being, beneficial to the health or the preservation of health; 'fit' as
suitable; and 'deleterious' as hurtful or destructive, injurious, detrimental."
131 214 Ore. 654, 330 P.2d 346 (1958).
132 221 La. 919, 60 So.2d 873 (1952).
133 101 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1958).
134 117 Utah 578, 218 P.2d 660 (1950).
135 288 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
136 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) ; referring to the Escola case supra, the Keller court
observed, at 349: "The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Traynor in that case is probably more
frequently cited in recent law reviews and texts than any other found."
137 Keller v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 131.
138 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963); the case is criticized in Jaeger, Privity of Warranty:
Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 DuQuEsNE U.L.'R-v. 1, 20-23 (1963), and in Jaeger, General
Practice Section, 1 A.B.A. NzWSLETTER No. 2, pp. 3, 4 (Oct. 1963).
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structive warranties, to the purchaser or those within "the distributive chain."
This decision certainly retarded consumer protection in Pennsylvania.
An excellent opportunity was afforded for the progressive development of
the law of warranty since the Uniform Commercial Code adopted ten years earlier
in Pennsylvania extends protection to members of the buyer's family, his house-
hold, or guests in his home.139 As to anything beyond that, the Code is neutral,
that is, it leaves it to the individual jurisdictions to decide whether privity is to
be relegated to a bygone era.140 Curiously enough, as has been previously signal-
ized, 4' as the rule was made by the court 4 ' it would seem that the courts, as in
New Jersey and New York in Henningsen and Goldberg respectively, 4 3 could
correct this lapse. On this point the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania takes refuge
in the ancient saw about "judicial legislation" and comments: "Further, it is not
for us to legislate or by interpretation to add to legislation, matters which the
legislature saw fit not to include."' 44 Nevertheless, the court recognizes that in
food cases, "nearly a third of the American jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania,
have broken away from the rule of 'privity of contract' in cases involving food,
beverages and like goods for human consumption, and have for various reasons
permitted a subpurchaser to sue the manufacturer directly in assumpsit... ,,'
Thus, considering that plaintiff "has an adequate remedy in trespass," the court
left George to his remedy(?) in tort, since he was not a subpurchaser.
A companion case from a sister jurisdiction, Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-
Cola Bottling Company,'46 is instructive as to what may happen when plaintiff
relies on a tort theory of recovery in an exploding bottle case, as suggested in
Hochgertel. The action was brought by a grocer and his minor daughter to
recover for injuries sustained by the daughter when the bottle broke in her hands
when she was attempting to open it and a tendon was severed in her left hand.'
Plaintiffs alleged three causes of action (1) breach of implied warranty; (2)
negligence; and (3) res ipsa loquitur. As to each, a verdict for the defendant
was directed: In the first, recovery was denied "because of the lack of
privity of contract between the minor plaintiff and the defendant." As to the
second, there was a directed verdict for the defendant upon a showing of "due
care"; finally, as to res ipsa the court pointed out there was no occasion for any
inference as to negligence by the defendant and consequently, a directed verdict
139 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
140 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE Comment 3 to § 2-318.
141 Supra p. 502.
142 Winterbottom v. Wright, supra note 13, where both obiter dicta are quoted.
143 Supra note 1 and supra note 11.
144 Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., supra note 138, at 577.
145 Since the plaintiff could not recover in assumpsit in this case, the Hochgertel court sug-
gested, at 579, that he had "an adequate remedy in trespass." Whether this remedy is truly
adequate may well be doubted, especially in jurisdictions where res ipsa loquitur has not pro-
gressed and it is possible for the defendant to show "due care" and escape liability. Once again,
a strong argument can be made for a separate and distinct action for breach of warranty hold-
ing the manufacturer absolutely liable.
146 53 Del. 477, 172 A.2d 252 (1961).
147 The court stated the facts:
On Thanksgiving Day, about 2:00 p.m., one of the Ciociola children,
not the minor plaintiff, took three bottles of Coca-Cola from the cooler for
consumption by the three Ciociola children. He noticed nothing unusual
about the bottles. The minor plaintiff rested the one given to her on a table,
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for the defendant on that count "was proper." Thus, in the classic tradition, the
Supreme Court of Delaware did not aid the cause of consumer protection. "8
Three months earlier, a Superior Court in the same jurisdiction had followed
the traditional line in Behringer v. William Gretz Brewing Co.4 " which is cited
in the Ciociola case. The same old moth-eaten strictures were then hauled out
to defeat recovery in this action for personal injuries. The plaintiff was an em-
ployee of a woman who operated a liquor store in Wilmington. Within the
scope of her employment, plaintiff opened a case of beer and took out a carrier
which held six sixteen-ounce bottles of beer. The cardboard carrier was defective,
and all six bottles fell through the bottom and struck plaintiffs left foot and
ankle causing injuries forming the basis of her complaint.
Two grounds of relief were alleged: (1) Negligence, including res ipsa
loquitur; and (2) breach of warranty. As to negligence, the court reviewed
the earlier cases,"'0 and concluded that unless the danger was "reasonable fore-
seeable - probable, not merely possible," there would be no recovery. Holding
that the bottom's falling out of the cardboard carrier was not "reasonably
foreseeable," defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted. This also
disposed of res ipsa loquitur."'
As to the second count for breach of warranty, the court made short shrift
by declaring that "privity of contract is essential in order to recover for breach
of warranty," citing Barni v. Kutner.'52 Again, summary judgment was granted
defendant.
In two other cases, the court achieved much more satisfactory results. Vallis
v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale' was an action by a kitchen helper in a restaurant;
the proprietor had purchased a bottle of "club soda" which exploded injuring
the plaintiff. After a judgment of nonsuit had been entered, this appeal was
taken. The judgment below was reversed on the ground that an implied war-
ranty of merchantability as to the bottle was available to the employee, and
holding it with her left hand grasping the bottle at about the middle, and
attempted to open the bottle with an ordinary bottle opener held in her right
hand. She applied normal pressure to the opener whereupon the bottle broke
in two parts. The break started at the top of the bottle in the area of the
lip and extended diagonally down to the level of the liquid. The break was
clean and the two parts thereafter fitted together perfectly. The minor plain-
tiff looked at the bottle before she attempted to open it but noticed no defect
in it.
As a result of the breaking of the bottle, a tendon in the left hand of the
minor plaintiff was severed in the area of the base of the thumb and index
finger. Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 146, at 254-55.
148 It has sometimes been suggested that the courts are more reluctant to deviate from the
privity concept in the case of the container since there is always the possibility of tampering.
However, more and more jurisdictions are requiring that the manufacturer or bottler establish
some basis for the allegation of tampering if this defense is to be successful.
149 53 Del. 365, 169 A.2d 249 (Del. Super. Ct. 1961).
150 Gorman v. Murphy Diesel Co., 42 Del. 149, 29 A.2d 145 (Del. Super. Ct. 1942); Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 44 Del. 39, 55 A.2d 148 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1947); Hunter v. Quality Homes, Inc., 45 Del. 100, 68 A.2d 620 (Del. Super. Ct.
1949).
151 In a number of jurisdictions, the concept of res ipsa loquitur has been broadened to in-
clude a number of situations where bottles have broken or exploded.
152 45 Del. 550, 76 A.2d 801 (Del. Super. Ct. 1950).
153 190 Cal. App.2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Jones v. Burgermeister
Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App.2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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that this warranty had been breached. The court reviewed many of the leading
precedents,15 4 and cited in support Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co. 5'
A Florida court in Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Florida v. Shaw... adopted
much the same line of reasoning in giving judgment for the plaintiff who was
injured when a bottle of soda broke in her hand. Recognizing that the general
trend all over the country is towards greater consumer protection, the court
decided that "If poisonous, unhealthful and deleterious food are placed by
the manufacturer upon the market and injuries occur by the consumption
thereof then the law should supply the injured person an adequate and speedy
remedy. It is our conclusion that the implied warranty remedy of enforcement
will accomplish the desired end."'5 7 This certainly is a sound approach and
one which may be counted on to afford the ultimate consumer much greater
protection. 5"
A comprehensive examination of beverage cases appears in Manzoni v.
Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co.5 s The question presented to the Supreme Court
of Michigan was whether the wife of a purchaser of a bottle of Coca-Cola could
properly maintain an action for breach of implied warranty when she became
ill from consuming the contents. Chemical analysis revealed that foreign sub-
stances were present in the beverage. Although the action was for the breach of
implied warranty of fitness for human consumption, defendant argued that "the
burden was upon the plaintiffs to show negligence." With a remarkably casual
disregard of the true state of the law, defendant also declared that there is "no
distinction between a count in implied warranty or in tort." In demolishing this
argument, Mr. Justice Smith, speaking for the Supreme Court, also indicated
how plaintiff could readily find himself on the horns of a dilemma when seeking
to pursue the traditional remedies of either tort or contract: 60
The fallacy in what is urged is the assertion that there is no
distinction between counts in warranty and in tort. Their similar-
154 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944);
Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 200, 102 N.E.2d 281 (Ohio C.P.
1951); Tennebaum v. Pendergast, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 231, 89 N.E.2d 490 (Ohio C.P. 1948); cf.
Alaska Pacific Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F,2d 643 (2d Cir. 1947); Trust v.
Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal.2d 217, 324 P.2d 583 (1958); Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33
Ca.2d 514, 203 P.24 522 (1949) ; Healey v. Trodd, 124 N.J.L. 64, 11A.2d 88 (1940) ; Cooper
v. Newman, 11 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. City Ct. 1939).
See also Pound, The Problem of the Exploding Bottle, 40 BoSTON U. L. Ray. 167 (1960).
155 54 Cal.2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575 (1960).
156 118 So.2d 840 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
157 Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Shaw, supra note 156, at 843, quoting the opinion of Flor-
ida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So.2d 910, 911 (Fla. 1953), which, in turn quotes
the leading case of Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d 313, 315 (1944).
158 Other cases which have dealt with the same question include Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan.
613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); cf. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 116 F. Supp.
122 (S.D.W.Va. 1953); Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co., 127 Conn. 44, 15 A.2d 181 (1940);
Atwell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Washington, D.C., 152 A.2d 196 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C.
1959); Canada Dry Ginger Ale Co. v. Jochum, 43 A.2d 42 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1945);
Poplar v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 180 Md. 389, 24 A.2d 783 (1942); Lasky v. Economy
Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65 N.E. 2d 305 (1946).
159 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d 918 (1961).
160 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Puerto Rico v. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958),
is a case of novel impression similar to the Manzoni case, supra note 159. The federal court was
called on to determine what the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico might do under the circum-
stances where the action was brought by the plaintiff consumer against defendant distributor.
Privity was absent, but the court recognized an exception to the doctrine in the case of foods
and similar products, affirming judgment for plaintiff consumer, relying on Castro v. Payco,
Inc., 75 P.R. 59 (1953).
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ity in the present context lies only in the fact that each is a remedy
aimed at the liability of the manufacturer and that each may be
grounded upon the presence of a deleterious or harmful substance
(e.g., mouse, fly, snake, mold, animal or human organs or residue)
in an article for human consumption. At this point, however, simi-
larities end and distinctions take over. The warranty action, of
ancient lineage, did not require a showing of negligence (though a
showing of negligence, of course, did not defeat it) but it did require
privity of contract. The negligence action, on the other hand, did
not require privity but it did require that the plaintiff show a lack
of due care with respect to the particular article, e.g., the bottle of
Coca-Cola in the present case. Either of these doctrines, literally
applied, gave the manufacturer a virtual immunity. As for privity,
the injured consumer and the manufacturer were contractual
strarigers, unless related by a fiction. As for negligence, the annual
output of such bottles often ran into the millions. To show the
negligence of the manufacturer with respect to any particular bottle
was an impossibility. 6'
The court then comments on the extensive changes wrought by the facts
of modern trade and commerce, centralized manufacturing operations in
strategic areas, and the tremendous volume of advertising and "assurances of
quality directly aimed at the ultimate consumers." The net result of the opera-
tion of these forces has been a significant change in legal theory. Foods and
beverages constitute but a small segment in the ever-broadening field of products
liability: "It ranges through areas both of contract and tort," as the court
remarks, "from the liability of the manufacturer of a defective automobile wheel,
or cinder blocks to that of the seller of an inflammable dress, or the distributor
of unwholesome food or contaminated drink, or even the purveyor of a caustic
perfume.'1
62
This statement of the court appears to justify the conclusion that a new
action, breach of constructive warranty, imposing absolute liability on the manu-
facturer or producer of deleterious or injuriously defective products is emerging.
This remedy would eliminate proof of negligence and discard any requirement
of privity.
Tobacco
While not exactly a food product, tobacco has by analogy been considered
in three recent cases as being in the same category with respect to privity. The
first of these, Green v. American Tobacco Company,6 ' was a referral case from
161 Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 159, at 238, 109 N.W.2d at
920 (Emphasis supplied). Affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the court noted that manufac-
turers are well placed to shoulder liability and to distribute its burdens and in consequence,
many jurisdictions have abandoned the requirement of privity outright. It may safely be con-
cluded that beverages are assimilated to foodstuffs in most jurisdictions.
162 Id. at 239-40, 109 N.W.2d at 921. Quoting extensively from the closely reasoned and
ably formulated opinion of Mr. Justice Francis in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra
note 1, Mr. Justice Smith, delivering the opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court, declared:
"The Supreme Court of New Jersey has recently given this modem development exhaustive
examination." Id. at 240, 109 N.W.2d at 921.
The court also cites Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, supra note 11; Sharp v. The Pitts-
burg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 180 Kan. 845, 308 P.2d 150 (1957); Spence v. Three Rivers
Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., supra note 11; Carter v. Yardley & Co., Ltd., 319 Mass. 92,
64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
163 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
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the Fifth Circuit.164 Briefly stated, the facts disclosed that Green died of lung
cancer (carcinoma) after having smoked Lucky Strike cigarettes most of his
adult life. His widow brought this action against the American Tobacco Com-
pany, the manufacturer, in the federal district court. Breach of warranty was
alleged since it was established that Green's carcinoma was the result of con-
tinued overindulgence in cigarette smoking. The trial court entered judgment
for the defendant manufacturer and plaintiff widow appealed. The judgment
below was affirmed by a divided court.165 There was a strong and well-reasoned
dissent wherein the pertinent Florida cases were reviewed. 6 Upon petition for
rehearing, this being a case of novel impression, the court decided to certify
the question of what Florida law would hold to the Supreme Court of Florida
pursuant to the provisions of the applicable Florida statute.'67
Chief Justice E. Harris Drew of the Supreme Court of Florida found that
Florida does not require privity of warranty in cases involving food and related
products such as tobacco. In his able and closely reasoned opinion, the Chief
Justice reviewed the earlier precedents 68 and held the manufacturer absolutely
liable without regard to foreseeability as to the consequences to be experienced
from the use of his product or "actual knowledge or opportunity for knowledge
of a defective or unwholesome condition" which, he said, "is wholly irrelevant
to his liability on the theory of implied warranty and the question certified
[Is the manufacturer absolutely liable?] must therefore be answered in the
affirmative."
169
When the case was returned to the Fifth Circuit, the manufacturer argued
that it should have a directed verdict as there was no evidence that the cigarettes
in question were not "reasonably fit and wholesome." Plaintiff contended that
the only issue remaining was a determination of damages. The appellate court
was not persuaded by either argument, but concluded: "The jury has not
made any sufficient finding on the question of reasonableness, that is, whether
or not the cigarettes were 'reasonably fit and wholesome.' "170 Remanding
the case, the court directed that a new trial should not cover the issues of
causation which had been decided adversely to the manufacturer during the
first trial and which were now the law of the case. Nor could defendant
manufacturer litigate anew the question of decedent's reliance on the implied
warranty. In a strong dissenting opinion it was stated that the remand, to
164 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
165 This case is an excellent illustration of the difficulties which confront a federal court
when faced with the necessity of determining what the highest state court would do if it were
presented with a similar factual situation. This is further discussed infra pp. 552-54.
166 These include: Smith v. Burdine's, Inc., 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223 (1940); Blanton v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d 313 (1944); Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp.,
39 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949), where the Supreme Court of Florida quoted from the able opinion
in Cushing v. Rodman, 65-App. D.C. 258, 82 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Lambert v. Sistrunk,
58 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1952); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1953); Food
Fair Stores of Florida v. Macurda, 93 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1957); Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Todd, 101 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1958); Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1961).
167 This certification is provided for under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1959).
168 In addition to the cases cited supra, note 166, Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133
So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961), appears in note 1, and Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability, is quoted
as to the significance of Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis.2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960).
169 Green v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 163, at 170-71.
170 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673, 677 (5th Cir. 1963).
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conform to the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida as clearly stated by
Chief Justice Drew, would leave only the question of damages for determina-
tion by the new trial. The dissent declared that it was "a complete rejection
of the law of warranty to hold that it could abrograte the requirement that
one admittedly injured by the use of tobacco could not recover unless he
showed further that the cigarettes were not reasonably fit and wholesome for
use by the general public."''
In the two other cases, a somewhat more reactionary result is encountered.
In Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit had before it on appeal a diversity of citizen-
ship case, Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company,"2 where the facts
were quite similar to the Green case supra. Plaintiff Pritchard had used Chester-
field cigarettes for more than thirty years before carcinoma compelled him to
have one lung removed. He alleged that he had relied on many representations
and assurances that the "nose, throat and accessory organs" are "not adversely
affected by smoking Chesterfields."'" It was proved that such statements ap-
peared in advertisements in newspapers and periodicals and were frequently
made on a national television program." 4 When the lower court dismissed the
action for damages, plaintiff appealed. The Third Circuit reversed on the
ground that a jury question was present which made the trial court's action
in granting motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict erroneous. As the ap-
171 Id. at 681, where the court continued: "Those words are used in the warranty to dem-
onstrate the universality of its application. Every sale it makes carries a warranty to each and
every member of the public. But each warranty is separate and covers the liability of the Tobac-
co Company to each separate individual to whom a sale is made. The finding of the jury has
settled the fact that the cigarettes sold to Green were not reasonably fit and wholesome for
use by him. No other question is, in my opinion, involved under the law of Florida with which
alone we are dealing."
172 295 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1961).
173 These assurances and representations were emphasized by the court as having been made
in various periodicals as well as on television; said the court, at 297:
One systematic and nationwide advertising campaign stands out in the
record. In essence, it said that "Nose, throat, and accessory organs not ad-
versely affected by smoking Chesterfields." (Emphasis supplied.) It
appeared in a Pittsburgh newspaper, a national magazine, and was repeated
on a national television program featuring Arthur Godfrey. Typical of the
commercials he presented was the following:
"* * * You hear stuff all the time about 'cigarettes are harmful to you'
this and that and the other thing. * * *"
"Here's an ad, you've seen it in the papers-please read it when you get
it. If you smoke it will make you feel better, really."
"Nose, throat and accessory organs not adversely affected by smoking
Chesterfield. This is the first such report ever published about any cigarette.
A responsible consulting organization has reported the results of a continuing
study by a competent medical specialist and his staff on the effects of smok-
ing Chesterfield cigarettes."
Later, Godfrey said: "That they mean what they say-that specialist said it,
Liggett and Myers have substantiated it. Remember that when you're won-
dering about cigarettes. Smoke Chesterfields-they're good. Thank you."
We think that the clear import of this advertising campaign was to lead
smokers to believe that in order to "Play Safe-Smoke Chesterfield." Plain-
tiff testified that he relied on these assurances thinking that he would suffer
no adverse effects from smoking Chesterfields. Whether it was reasonable
for him to so rely was, of course, a matter for the jury. Pritchard v. Liggett
& Myers Tobacco Co. supra note 172, at 297. (Footnotes omitted.)
174 Among the publications mentioned in the court's footnotes are Time, Life, Saturday
Evening Post, and the Pittsburgh Press.
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pellate court observed: "From the evidence, the jury could very well have con-
cluded that there was an implied warranty of merchantability."' 75
Upon remand, it appears that judgment was given for defendant. 7 6
In sharp contrast to the Green case, and holding to the line of orthodox
decisions which the billion dollar tobacco industry has been careful to preserve,
the Fifth Circuit, in Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Companyy17  re-
jected the doctrine of absolute liability advanced by the widow of the decedent
cigarette smoker in her action against the two manufacturers whose products
her husband had used with fatal results. In its reactionary opinion, the appel-
late court approved the language of the federal district court:
"But such implied warranty does not cover substances in the manufactured
products, the harmful effects of which no developed human skill or foresight
can [avoid] .. .,178 The court had quoted the opinion in the original Green
case 79 to the effect that the doctrine of implied warranty by a manufacturer
"is founded on his superior opportunity to gain knowledge of the product and
to form a judgment of its fitness."'"8 What is truly remarkable is the court's
statement that this principle is clearly deducible "from all of the Florida cases
on implied warranty."'' A rude awakening was in store for the Fifth Circuit
when the opinion of Chief Justice Drew was delivered in Green v. American
Tobacco Company. 2 a few weeks later: "our decisions conclusively establish
the principle that a manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or opportunity
for knowledge of a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to
his liability on the theory of implied warranty ...""'
The reasoning in Lartigue v. R. J. Tobacco Co. 4 and the test applied leave
something to be desired. Assume for the sake of argument that a new wonder
"drug" is to be marketed under the name "Myomyomyocin." It has been care-
fully checked and put through any number of different tests. Nevertheless, when
it is finally made available for public consumption a number of people have
varying degrees of unfortunate side effects ranging from headaches to fainting
spells. Sometimes the injury is permanent. Should it be said that lack of fore-
seeability should relieve the manufacturer of liability?' If so, then the tort
action does not provide an adequate remedy and thus there is a further argu-
ment for having a separate breach of constructive warranty action wherein
the manufacturer would be held absolutely liable as the Supreme Court of
175 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., supra note 172, at 297.
176 See Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 DuQuEsNE U.L. Rev.
1, 9 n. 28. Cf. Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., infra note 177, at 38 n. 42, citing
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., D.C.W.D. Pa. 1962, on remand.
177 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
178 Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra note 177, at 39.
179 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
180 This statement is criticized in the dissenting opinion in Green v. American Tobacco Co.,
325 F.2d 673, 680 (5th Cir. 1963), referring to the Lartigue case, supra note 177, at 37-39.
181 Green v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 179, at 77; in light of the analysis of these
cases as cited in note 166 supra by the Supreme Court of Florida, this statement seems hardly
supportable.
182 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
183 Id. at 170.
184 Supra note 177.
185 As in several of the cases which deal with the liability of manufacturers of tobacco
products, as in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., supra note 172.
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Florida indicated in Green v. American Tobacco Co.' As between having one
of two innocent parties bear the loss, the one best able (who is also the one
initiating the entire chain of circumstance) should be the one to take the loss.
The same criticism which pertains to the Lartigue case is applicable with
even greater force to Ross v. Philip Morris & Co.' Not only does it illustrate
the grave mistakes a federal court can make while seeking to divine state law
when required by diversity of citizenship"'8 to make an Erie'8 -educated guess,
but underlines the law's slow, insolent delays. Plaintiff had smoked Philip Morris
steadily for eighteen years when a cancer operation had to be performed on
his throat. He filed his action in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri,
in 1954; it was then removed to the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri on the ground of diversity of citizenship. It was
finally tried to a jury in that court in June and July 1962. In spite of a sub-
stantial number of cases emanating from various courts in Missouri which
plaintiff adduced, and which clearly pointed to the obliteration of privity as a
defense in breach of implied warranty cases, the federal court steadfastly ad-
hered to its express belief that the Supreme Court of Missouri would continue
to follow the pernicious precedent(?) of the judges' obiter dicta in Winier-
bottom v. Wright.'
The court reviewed the various "food and drink" cases cited by plaintiff
in support of his action and then quoted an appellate court opinion in Belt Seed
Company v. Mitchelhill Seed Co.:.9
Implied, unlike express, warranties are arrived at by operation
of law and conclusions announced by the court upon established
facts. For the sake of convenience, merely, such an obligation (an
implied warranty) is permitted to be enforced under the form of
a contract.
1 92
"Such pronouncement," commented the federal district court, "is the ratioc-
ination of the rulings made by the intermediate courts of appeals of Missouri
in the above-cited cases.' 9 3
The court then observes, contrary to what the plaintiff contends, and what
the Supreme Court of Missouri has since held,' as to breach of implied war-
ranty:
While the foregoing cases involve decisions of the several
intermediate courts of appeals and not of the Supreme Court of
Missouri, it is plaintiff's contention that they set forth a well rec-
ognized and firmly entrenched Missouri doctrine with regard to
products manufactured and sold for human consumption, and
show that the ultimate purchaser-consumer can recover against
a manufacturer of products on the theory of breach of implied
186 Supra note 182.
187 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958), aff'd, 328 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1964).
188 See infra p. 552.
189 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
190 Supra note 13.
191 153 S.W.2d 106 (Mo. App. 1941).
192 Id. at 112.
193 Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., supra note 187, at 691.
194 Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963).
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warranty of wholesomeness and fitness. With much certitude,
plaintiff asserts:
" . . . it appears evident (from the foregoing decisions)
that when the Supreme Court (of Missouri) does get a case
before it between an ultimate purchaser-consumer against
a remote manufacturer, based on implied warranty- it
will hold as the three Courts of Appeals held in the numer-
ous cases hereinbefore cited."'' "5
The argument that plaintiff makes in respect to the above
propositions is cogent, but it leaves us neither convinced nor
persuaded that such is the progression to be given to Missouri
law in light of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Missouri in
State ex rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shain. 9
At this point, the court cites one of its own decisions, McIntyre v. Kansas
City Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,'97 as a precedent for the instant case, concluding
that it has correctly apprehended the law of Missouri, and states its conviction
that "the doctrine of implied warranty of merchantability was not an axiom likely
to be sustained by the Supreme Court of Missouri . . . [w]e understand the
controlling law of that State to be that a remote vendee of goods produced
by a manufacturer cannot maintain an action for breach of implied war-
ranty."'9 s The court thereupon rendered summary judgment for defendant com-
pany, and plaintiff appealed. In the meantime, the Supreme Court of Missouri
emphatically and unequivocally disagreed 99 with the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri and held specifically that the two
cases.. which were cited in support of its opinion by that court in Ross v.
195 Quoting at 691 Brief for Plaintiff, p. 11, Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., supra note 187;
the cases which are reviewed include the so-called (by the court) "food and drink" decisions:
"Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Mo. App. St. Louis 1936, 90 S.W.2d 445;
Nemela v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Mo. App. St. Louis 1937, 104 S.W.2d 773; McNicholas
v. Continental Baking Co., Mo. App. St. Louis 1938, 112 S.W.2d 849; Hutchison v. Moerschel
Products Co., Mo. App. Kansas City 1939, 133 S.W.2d 701; Carter v. St. Louis Dairy Co.,
Mo. App. St. Louis 1940, 139 S.W.2d 1025; Helms v. General Baking Co., Mo. App. St. Louis
1942, 164 S.W.2d 150; Holyfield v. Joplin Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Mo. App. Kansas City
1943, 170 S.W.2d 451; Norman v. Jefferson City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Mo. App. Kansas
City 1948, 211 S.W.2d 552; Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Mo. App. St. Louis 1948, 215
S.W.2d 314; Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Mo. App. St. Louis 1953, 285 S.W.2d 53.
In a like form of action, the St. Louis Court of Appeals sustained a claim for breach of implied
warranty, for skin infection incurred from use of a detergent produced by defendant when
purchased from an independent retailer. See Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., Mo. App.
St. Louis 1952, 253 S.W.2d 532." Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., supra note 187, at 690.
196 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 19 (1944).
197 85 F. Supp. 708 (W.D.Mo. 1949). Concerning this case, the court said in Ross, supra
note 187, at 691: "We had occasion to examine and survey the law of Missouri as to a right of
action for breach of implied warranty." However, the court was dealing "with a donee of a
remote vendee and an object other than one for human consumption in original packages."
(Emphasis supplied.)
198 Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., supra note 187, at 691. (Emphasis supplied.)
199 Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., supra note 194; the Supreme Court of Missouri
took note of the fact that the federal district courts in Missouri, as well as the eighth circuit
had endeavored to prognosticate what the Missouri law would hold as to implied warranty and
that their forecast indicated that Missouri would not grant recovery in the absence of privity.
To this conclusion, the Supreme Court rejoined, at 52: "Those cases, of course, are not bind-
ing upon this court ......
200 Jones ex rel. Store Co. v. Shain, supra note 196; Zesch v. Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia,
353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W.2d 140 (1944).
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Philip Morris & Co.2 ' were inapposite since they did not involve l ck of
privity.202
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit just a few
months ago, having the benefit of Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corporation0 5
wherein the high court of Missouri had effectively disposed of the privity. argu-
ment, quoted from Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,2 0 a case which had been
stressed by the plaintiff in the court below:
Considerations of public policy * * * and the protection of the
health of the consuming public require that an obligation be
placed upon the manufacturer of Coca-Cola to see to it, at his
peril, that the product he offers the general public is fit for the
purpose for which it is intended, namely, human consumption.
The "demands of social justice" require that his liability should
be made absolute.205
The appellate court also noted the definite trend in Missouri to get away
from the privity requirement in actions by the ultimate consumer against a
manufacturer for breach of implied warranty of fitness.
And this trend embraces products other than those in the typical food or
beverage situation; as the court recognizes, "we conclude that under the proper
factual situation the Missouri courts would impose the same strict liability upon
a manufacturer of cigarettes as has been applied in the food and beverage
cases."
'2°6
However, the court was disinclined to hold the manufacturer absolutely
liable as had the Florida court in the Green case, and thus revealed a curiously
anachronistic tendency completely at odds with the usual predilection of the
federal judiciary as declared in Picker X-Ray Corporation v. General Motors
Corporation:07 "Federal judges, in following state law, have been prone to
advance implied warranty liability at the expense of the priviiy requirement."2 '
Holding that since "no developed human skill or foresight could afford
knowledge" of the cancerous effect of smoking defendant's cigarettes, 29"the
lower court's summary judgment for defendant manufacturer would be af-
firmed.210
201 Supra note 187, at 691-92.
202 Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., supra note 194, where, at 51, the Supreme Court
said: "In the Jones case there was no question of privity. Privity existed because the suit was
by a purchaser of a satin blouse from defendant in the defendant's store." Referring to the
Zesch case, supra note 200, the court stated, at 52, that it dealt with "a vendor-vendee situa-
tion where privity of contract existed." As to privity generally, and its abolition see Jaeger,
Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 DUQUESNE U.L. Rav. 1 (1963), which the
Missouri Supreme Court cites, at 54, with approval, "especially the conclusion therein reached,
Loc. Cit. 141-42."
203 Supra note 194.
204 285 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. App. 1955).
205 Id. at 55. (Emphasis supplied.) Quoted in the Ross case, 328 F.2d 1, 8 (8th Cir. 1964).
206 Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 1, 8 (8th Cir. 1964).
207 Supra note 2.
208 Citing some of the leading diversity cases including Chapman v. Brown, supr note 2,
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Bowles v. Zinmier Mfg. Co.,
277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960); Spada v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 195 F. Supp. 819 (D. Ore.
1961); Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
209 Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., supra note 206, at 10.
210 While noting that the Supreme Court of Florida had ruled that "implied warranty
liability is not limited by the foreseeability doctrine, the 'reasonable application of humaan dkill
and foresight' test of tort liability," Green v. American Tobacco Company, 154 So.2d at'172,
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Mechanical Devices
Taking its place with the automotive trilogy2 ' is Ford Motor Company
v. Mathis."' Here, the dimmer switch in a Ford failed the driver in his hour of
need and he and the vehicle left the road and collided with a tree. Substantial
injury resulted and this action was brought against the manufacturer for breach
of implied warranty. At the outset, the court pointed out that it had not found
"any Texas case directly in point." '' However, the court did cite and discuss
S. Blickman, Inc. v. Chilton,..4 where the legal principles adverted to were
deemed helpful." 5 The court observed: "To hold the assembler liable for the
negligence of its component-part manufacturer appears to be a sound and
realistic doctrine. Reminiscent of the law merchant which developed out of the
needs and practices of the business community, this principle surely reflects
the outlook of this modem world of big business advertising in a big way." 26
The court cites many of the most significant cases including Jacob E.
Decker & Sons v. Capps,"7 Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey,"' and Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc."' to illustrate the constantly expanding categories of
products "within the area of strict liability." The court, affirming judgment for
plaintiff, concluded that "Texas law holds the manufacturer-assembler liable
for the negligence of its supplier of a component part.""'
Also applying the law of Texas, the federal district court in Siegel v.
Braniff Airways, Inc.,"' citing certain earlier cases,"' declared: "The trend
generally is to abrogate the requirement of privity of contract.""' The court
then cites with approval Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply,
Inc."4 and summarizes the arguments against privity:
it added, "we are not compelled to hold that the Missouri Supreme Court would arrive at the
same conclusion as the Florida court." While this may well be, there is nothing -in the Morrow
case to suggest that absolute liability would not be imposed by the Missouri high court.
211 State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110
N.W.2d 449 (1961); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1; General Motors
Corp. v. Dodson, 338 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960).
212 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963).
213 Id. at 272; nor, says the court, has any been cited to it.
214 114 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
215 The court summarized the facts: The injured plaintiff fell off a defective bar stool in a
hotel. An independent contractor who was remodeling the hotel at the time was named de-
fendant. The court gave judgment for plaintiff since the contractor had represented that the
stools were a product of his own factory although in point of fact they were not. In so holding
defendant contractor liable, the court adopted the Restatement of Torts rule as expounded in
§ 400. Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, supra note 212, at 272-73.
216 Id. at 273. At this point, the court added: "Without faintly suggesting even a remote
whisper of a- possibility that we are now subconsciously lapsing into notions of express warran-
ties, the law ought to be able to reckon with the force to which its votaries are daily exposed, at
least off the bench or out of chambers." It then quotes Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co., supra note 11, to the effect that the world of merchandising is no longer a
world of direct contract; "it is rather, a world of advertising ......
217 Supra note 11.
218 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942).
219 Supra note 1.
220 Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, supra note 212, at 276.
221 204 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
222 Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, supra note 11; International Derrick & Equipment
Co. v. Croix, 241 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1957); Johnson v. Murray Co., 90 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., supra note 11; Parish v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 11.
223 Siegel v. Braniff Airways, Inc., supra note 221, at 864.
224 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
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1. The decisional approach which requires privity in breach of implied
warranty actions is based upon fallacious reasoning.225
2. While some courts have followed the earlier cases requiring privity, the
fallacy of this approach has become apparent in many jurisdictions and the
privity doctrine has been discarded in numerous cases involving food.2
3. The requirement of privity in negligence causes of action has been
discarded, particularly in cases where the product involved is "a thing of
danger. 22 r
4. The same considerations which have prompted the demise of the
privity requisite in negligence actions and in implied warranty actions involving
food are present in this breach of warranty action involving an aircraft.228
5. There has been no logical or realistic reason advanced why privity
should be retained in a breach of implied warranty case. 9
As might be expected from the court's careful exposition of the current
trend, the motion of defendant aircraft manufacturer to dismiss the action for
breach of implied warranty of quality and fitness of the airplane which had
crashed was denied. It was held that under Texas law the widow and children
of the airplane passenger who had been killed in the crash were proper parties
to this action against the manufacturer.22 '
In view of the enormous increase of automotive and airborne travel, with
more than 70 million vehicles, and tens of thousands of aircraft menacing the
lives of countless numbers of people, it is not astonishing that there is an ever-
mounting incidence of actions based on breach of implied warranties as to the
suitability of these mechanical devices for their intended purpose. Of the utmost
significance, and to be compared with Siegel v. Braniff Airways, Inc.,21 is
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,"2 also involving an action by the
surviving mother, the administratrix of her decedent daughter's estate. The
court specifically declared:
We granted leave to appeal in order to take another step toward
a complete solution of the problem partially cleared up in Greenberg
v. Lorenz, 23 3 and Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid
Co.23 4 The question now to be answered is: does a manufacturer's
implied warranty of fitness of his product for its contemplated
225 Especially since it started by way of obiter dicta in Winterbottom v. Wright, supra
note 13.
226 Supra pp. 515-21.
227 As, for example, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra note 16.
228 Here, the court continues: "The nature of this product is one which may well place life
and limb in danger if that product is defective." Siegel v. Braniff Airways, Inc., supra note 221,
at 864.
229 The court then declares that the Decker case "and the other cases cited herein indicate
that the definite and persuasive trend is towards the abrogation of this anachronism." Id.,
at 865.
230 Siegel v. Braniff Airways, Inc., supra note 221, followed in Conlon v. Republic Aviation
Corp., 204 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) citing (since Michigan law would govern) Spence
v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., supra note 11; under the New York Conflict
of Laws rule the law of the place where the accident happened, i.e., Michigan, would be applied.
231 Supra note 221.
232 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
233 Supra note 2.
234 Supra note 11.
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use run in favor of all its intended users, despite lack of privity
of contract?235
The complaint alleged that a faulty altimeter was responsible for the crash
of. the airliner. The lower courts held that in the absence of privity no claim
for breach of implied warranty might be enforced against a warrantor2 .6 de-
spite the decisions of the New York Court of Appeals in Greenberg and Randy
Knitwear."2 7 This prompted the New York court to remark: "The enormous
literature on this subject 38 and the historical development of the law of war-
ranties to its present state.. need not be reviewed beyond the references in our
Greenberg and Randy Knitwear opinions (supra). '2 °
Since the defendants were arguing that California law should govern on
the theory of "grouping of contracts [contracts?],"" 1 the court discussed the
applicable California precedents, especially Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co.2 42
and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.24 in each of which strict liability
"regardless of privity" was imposed on the manufacturer. 44 However, the court
concluded that it would make no particular difference as to the manufacturer's
liability whether California or New York law was deemed applicable. 4 As to
the latter, it declared that "it is no extension [of existing court-made liability
law] at all to include airplanes and the passengers for whose use they are built
- and, indeed, decisions are at hand which have upheld complaints, sounding
in breach of warranty, against manufacturers of aircraft where passengers lost
their lives when the planes crashed."24
The majority of the court, speaking through Chief Judge Desmond, held
that in addition to defendant American Airlines, Lockheed, the manufacturer
of the aircraft in which the deceased passenger had been riding, should not have
had its motion to dismiss granted, but that as to Kollsman, manufacturer of the
defective altimeter, the motion was properly granted by the court below.24
235 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., supra note 232, at 81.
236 23 Misc.2d 215, 199 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 12 App. Div.2d 906, 214
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961).
237 Supra notes 2 and 11 respectively.
238 For the many articles, comments and notes that product liability has inspired, see supra
notes 98 and 99.
239 Fully reviewed in Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 11.
240 Goldberg v. Kolisman Instrument Corp., supra note 232, at 435, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 593,
191 N.E.2d at 82.
241 As explained in Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), and citing Poplar
v. Bourjois, Inc., 298 N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948).
242 54 Cal.2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575 (1960).
243 59 Cal.2d 67, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
244 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., supra note 232, at 435, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 593,
191 N.E.2d at 82, where these cases are discussed.
245 The court observed, "it really makes no difference whether New York or California law
be applied, since in this respect both States use the same rules." Goldberg v. Kollsman Instru-
ment Corp., supra note 232, at 436, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 594, 191 N.E.2d at 83.
246 Citing as examples Conlon v. Republic Aviation Corp., supra note 230; Middleton v.
United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,
202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962); Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
247 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., supra note 232, stating, at 437, 240 N.Y.S.2d
at 595, 191 N.E.2d at 83, "for the present at least we do not think it necessary so to extend
this rule [of liability] as to hold liable the manufacturer (defendant Kollsman) of a component
part. Adequate protection is provided for the passengers by casting in liability the airplane
manufacturer which put into the market the completed aircraft."
Earlier, the court had said: "As we all know, a number of courts outside of New York
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Thus, a gigantic step with seven-league boots was taken towards the abolition
of privity. However, there was a dissenting opinion which reviewed a number
of the earlier cases.24
The Supreme Court of Missouri resolved all doubts as to where that
jurisdiction stands by its opinion in Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp.249
Plaintiff, mother had purchased a gas range from a local dealer who had obtained
it from the manufacturer's distributor. A few days after it had been installed,
it proved defective in that the valves failed to control the flow of gas which,
when ignited, produced flames which reached the ceiling. A service representative
of the retail dealer found that the valves were defective and he made the neces-
sary repairs, replacing the valves. Several days later the mother left her
daughter in charge of the house and departed for Alabama. While cooking
some food, the left side of the gas range emitted tremendous flames and soon
the wallpaper was burning. By the time she had removed her ten brothers
and sisters from the house, it was burning and was eventually completely de-
stroyed.
When this action was filed against the manufacturer, judgment was
rendered for the plaintiff mother who had purchased the range."' The testimony
had clearly indicated that defective valves had been responsible for the de-
State have for the best of reasons dispensed with the privity requirement (see Jaeger, Privity
of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DUqUESNE U.L. Rav. 1 (1963))."
248 Id. at 437-43, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595-600, 191 N.E.2d at 83-87. -
249 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963).
250 Defendant manufacturer moved "to quash the summons and service or, in the alterna-
tive, to dismiss plaintiff's action for want of jurisdiction" on the ground that it was a: foreign.
corporation not "doing business" in Missouri, nor having "a registered agent or an agent. for
service of process" in that state. Consequently, assertion of jurisdiction over defendant manu-
facturer was a violation of the "due process" provision of the XIV Article of Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. Under the circumstances, when the manufacturer appealed
from the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff vendee, the Springfield Court of Appeals
transferred the "cause" to the Supreme Court of Missouri since it involved a question of consti-
tutional interpretation or construction, Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 362 S.W.2d 282
(Mo. App. 1962).
After an extensive and illuminating discussion of the activities of defendant corporation in
Missouri and a detailed review of the cases, more especially International Shoe' Company v .
State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and Wooster v. Trimont Mfg. Co., 356 Mo. 682,
203 S.W.2d 411 (1947), the 'Court concluded that defendant corporation was "doing business"
in Missouri and that service of process bad been properly made on its agent in that state. Thii
defense illustrates one more stumbling block which may be interposed to defeat reovery where'
defective products are involved.
In Nixon v. Cohn, 385 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1963), plaintiffs were injured when they were
thrown out of their seats while riding "a giant amusement machine" described as the "Meteor."
Defendant, an Oregon corporation which had manufactured the machine, moved to quash
service of summons and to dismiss the action against it for lack of jurisdiction. The trial couit
entered judgment quashing service on the corporation and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme
Court of Washington reversed and remanded, its opinion being very similar to that in Morrow
v. Caloric Appliance Corp., supra note 249. There was an extensive discussion of the Interna-
tional Shoe Company case supra. The Nixon court, at 308, referred to "the famous case of
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 2d L.Ed. 565, [where] it was established that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution is violated wherd a court
renders a personal judgment against a nonresident individual defendant without having jurs-
diction over him and that, as a matter of due process, it cannot acquire such jurisdiction merely
by serving process upon him outside the forum or by publication." In the many years which
have intervened since the decision in Pennoyer, supra, the court found that "the concept of state
jurisdiction over nonresidents has been greatly expanded." Also, that there is a definite ten-
dency to liberalize the concept of "doing business." Cf. De Claire Mink Ranches v. Federal
Foods Inc., 192 F. Supp. 148 (N.D. Iowa 1961); Trussell v. Bear Mfg. Co., 215 F. Supp. 802
(E.D.Tenn. 1963); Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963).
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struction brought about by the flaming gas range. Defendant manufacturer ap-
pealed, and the Supreme Court of Missouri summarized the issue:
The precise question now presented to this court (for the first
time insofar as we have found) is whether privity of contract is
necessary in order for an ultimate consumer to recover from a
manufacturer of an implied warranty or, perhaps stated more
frankly, whether a manufacturer of an instrumentality which is
imminently dangerous if defectively manufactured is to be held
to strict liability upon proof of the defect and of causation.251
The appellant argued that the "overwhelming weight of the judicial
decisions in the State of Missouri, and in the Federal Courts, construing
[interpreting?25 2] the law of Missouri on the issues here involved, hold that in
the absence of privity there can be no recovery by a retail customer" from the
manufacturer on the theory of an implied warranty of fitness for the purpose
intended. The court analyzed the various cases 5 . adduced by the appellant and
concluded that they were not in point. As to the inaccurate guesses made by
the federal courts purporting to interpret the law of Missouri, these were clearly
not binding on the highest state court which so held in rejecting them. 254 The
court quoted extensively from Worley v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing
Co. 255 wherein plaintiff sought to recover damages from the manufacturer of
a detergent which she alleged had injured her skin. Although privity was lacking,
the court found that she was entitled to invoke the theory of implied warranty."'
In its analysis of the case, the court indicated that the implied or "con-
structive" warranty under consideration although originally sounding in tort
was regarded in the nature of an action on the case for deceit, and that sub-
sequently assumpsit was employed in seeking damages for breach. 57 After a com-
prehensive review of the Missouri precedents, 28 the Supreme Court embarked
251 Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., supra note 249, at 51.
252 As to the difference between construction and interpretation of documents, whether
contracts or otherwise, see 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS ch. 22 (3d ed. 1961), esp. § 602.
253 Including Stewart v. Martin, 353 Mo. 1, 181 S.W.2d 657 (1944); State ex rel. Jones
Store Co. v. Shain, 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 19 (1944) ; Zesch v. Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia,
supra note 200; the court also mentions decisions of the federal courts purporting "to determine
what the Missouri law as to to implied warranty is or would be" and rejected their conclusions.
254 Particularly emphatic and erroneous was the federal court's opinion in Ross v. Philip
Morris & Co., 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958) where it held that lack of privity would be
a bar to an action by a cancerous cigarette smoker against the manufacturer of his brand; in the
meantime, while the case was pending on appeal from a judgment in favor of defendant com-
pany, the Morrow case, supra note 249 was decided. Thereafter, recognizing that privity of
warranty was moribund in Missouri, the Eighth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the injuri-
ous consequences, particularly the cancer-producing propensities, of cigarette smoking were not
"reasonably foreseeable" by the manufacturer; see supra note 187.
255 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952); this case has been repeatedly cited and
quoted.
256 However, plaintiff was denied recovery on the ground "that she failed to show that
'Tide' contained any ingredients or chemicals injurious to the skin of the normal person . . ."
The appellate court suggested that "in the interest of social justice," there was no good reason
why they could not "reshape the law to conform to the requirements of modem economic life."
Worley v. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 255, at 536-37. (Emphasis added.)
257 In this connection, the court remarked: "The necessities of logic do not require that we
disregard legal history, which refutes the oft repeated statement that a warranty is necessarily
a contractual obligation, and follow decisions which have imposed arbitrary limitations resting
upon convenence, or considerations of policy not applicable at the present time." Ibid.
258 In addition to the Worley case, supra note 255, and those cited supra note 253, the court
discusses Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 327 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. App. 1959); Dotson v. International
Harvester Co., 365 Mo. 625, 285 S.W.2d 585 (1955); Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling
Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959); Albers Milling Co. v. Carney, 341 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1960) in
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upon a painstaking survey of the leading cases from other jurisdictions. 59
The court was thereby impelled to its ultimate conclusion:
Careful consideration of the recent decisions of the courts of
other states to the same effect, the inclination of the courts of
this state to modify the harsh results flowing from a rule of caveat
emptor in analogous fact situations, the logic of the reasoning
upon which these cases (and numerous other cases therein cited)
are rules in an effort to afford justice to the vast majority of the
"consumer" citizenry, whose well-being, health and very lives are
dependent in great degree upon processed food and manufactured
articles and facilities, the fitness or safe use of which the ordinary
"consumer" can know little or nothing other than the fact that
the processor or manufacturer holds them out to the public as
fit and reasonably safe for use by the "consumer" when used in
the manner and for the purpose for which they are manufactured
and sold, lead inevitably to the conclusion that under the facts as
found by the jury the appellant is to be held liable as an implied
warrantor of the fitness and reasonable safety of the gas cooking
range here involved, despite lack of privity of contract.2 0
Other Products
Heretofore, the case discussion has been confined to instances where the
defective products caused death or personal injury. But at least one jurisdiction
has gone far beyond and obliterated privity where the consumer sought re-
covery for defective cinder blocks, Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry
Supply, Inc.2"1 The Supreme Court of Michigan, voicing its opinion through
Judge Voelker," 2 engaged upon a comprehensive and far-reaching examination
of privity and decided that the time had come to abolish this judge-made "re-
quirement." The action was brought by a home owner, although she had not
purchased the blocks from the manufacturer-defendant. The builder who had
bought them appeared not to have been available and was reportedly -out of
the jurisdiction. Had privity been applied, Mrs. Spence's remedy against the
building contractor would have been nugatory and she would have been un-
able to recover damages when the cinder blocks in her home disintegrated.s
the two last-cited cases, the Supreme Court held that feed intended for consumption by animals
(fish and turkeys respectively) should be included in the exception to the so-called privity
"requirement." Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., supra note 249, at 53-54, where the court
added: "See also a more recent and extended discussion by Walter H. E. Jaeger, appearing in
the Spring 1963 DUQUESNE U. LAw Ray., Vol. 1, pp.1-142, and especially the conclusion
therein reached, loc. cit. 141-142."
259 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1; Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod-
ucts, Inc., supra note 11; Ketterer v. Armour and Co., supra note 11; Klein v. Duchess Sand-
wich Co., supra note 11; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., supra note 11; State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., supra note 2; 50 New Walden,
Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co., 39 Misc.2d 460, 241 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1963). In 50 New Walden
supra, the court found a breach of implied warranty even in the absence of a contract of sale.
260 Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., supra note 249, at 55; as might be expected by the
foregoing, judgment for the plaintiff vendee of the gas range was affirmed.
261 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
262 Under the pseudonym Robert Traver, Judge Voelker wrote Anatomy of a Murder.
263 After installation, the cinder blocks developed red splotches described as "bleeding," and
proved entirely unfit for use in walls. There had been a finding in the court below that the cin-
der blocks were defective and that this constituted a breach of warranty that the goods were of
merchantable quality, contrary to Section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act. Michigan has since
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.
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. The lower court had, as might be expected, given judgment for defendant
manufacturer when the latter invoked the defense of lack of privity. When
plaintiff appealed, the high court of Michigan recognized that precedent gave
the trial court little or no choice, stating:
In fact, in the past in these situations we have not only
tended to severely limit the factual area of recovery but we have
shown an equally ready disposition to adopt and embrace the
whole dreary legal apparatus and rhetoric so long employed in
these situations to narrow or prevent any recovery at all. Some of
these open sesame phrases are: whether there was privity or the
lack of it; whether the defect was latent or patent; whether or
not the offending product was sold in the original package; whether
a vague requirement of a higher degree of care might sometimes
alter the application of the rule; or whether the defective product
did or did not contain an "inherently or imminently dangerous"
article or substance harmful to humans. We do not exhaust the
list. There are other equally impressive and ominous catch-phrases,
and awesome have been some of the semantic bogs negotiated
by ours and other appellate courts when in particularly harsh cases
they have attempted by such artificial exceptions to get around
the barrier imposed by their own equally artificial "general rule"
of nonliability1
6 4
The court proceeded in humorous vein to review a number of Michigan
cases in which the courts have "faltered" in their reverence for the hallowed
doctrine of privity as exemplified in Smolenski v. Libby, McNeill & Libby,
265
as in Bosch v. DamM, 211 where the court "strayed from the paths of virtue" to
the extent of approving a recovery by a remote vendee against the manufacturer
of a defective refrigerator. However, the judgment was later vacated on other
grounds. Another departure occurred in Ebers v. General Chemical Co.2 8
where the user of a defective insecticide was permitted to recover against the
remote manufacturer although privity was lacking. Nevertheless, these cases
were inconclusive.
Saddled with such a doctrine and its hair-splitting exceptions,
it is not surprising that while a few of our decisions have afforded
passing illusory comfort to all, certainty has been afforded to none.
The reason is simple: A court lacking a clear and understandable
rule of its own can scarcely be expected to impart it to others. Legal
confusion has inevitably resulted. Aggrieved plaintiffs have scarcely
known whether to sue in deceit or fraud or for negligence or breach
of warranty - or indeed whether it was worthwhile to sue at all.2 68
After running through the entire gamut of variations, exceptions, the fate
264 Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., supra note 261. In Hertzler
v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 422, 200 N.W. 155, 156 (1924), where poison was found in some
flour, the Michigan court "uttered the towering legal understatement of the year" when it ob-
served that the cases "appear hopelessly at variance." Adhering strictly to the privity concept, the
court in Hertzler held food cases to be an exception, but "only by reason of a want of a high
degree of care." This case is not unique in the "curious things courts can bring themselves to do
and say when they try vainly to wed the outmoded thinking and legal cliches of the past to the
pressing realities of modern life."
265 280 Mich. 329, 273 N.W. 587 (1937).
266 296 Mich. 522, 296 N.W. 669 (1941).
267 310 Mich. 261, 17 N.W.2d 176 (1945).
268 Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., supra note 261, at 128, 90
N.W.2d at 878.
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of privity in the negligence cases as exemplified by MacPherson,269 and its in-
terposition in breach of warranty cases, the court concludes that it might be
well simply to eliminate the so-called "general rule" entirely.270
Somewhat in the same category as Spence, but dealing with textile material
and an express rather than implied warranty, the Court of Appeals of New
York reached substantially the same result: It discarded privity as an essential
to bringing an action for breach of warranty. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co.2 ' is a vital link between Greenberg v. Lorenz2 72 and Goldberg
v. Kollsman Instrument Corp."' wherein privity's death knell was finally sounded
in New York. The corporate plaintiff had executed several contracts for the
purchase of textile material with defendant company. When some of the fabric
failed to conform to written representations as to shrinkage, an action in breach
of warranty was brought against the manufacturer. As expected, the traditional
defense of lack of privity was relied on by defendant. The court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Fuld, reviewed the somewhat inglorious history of the
privity "requirement" beginning with Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co.2"4 where, un-
fortunately, lack of privity was deemed a defense.
Relying on Greenberg, and extending it by holding the manufacturer liable
for breach of an express warranty inducing the purchase of goods by advertising
certain qualities, the court observed:
The rationale underlying the decisions rejecting the privity
requirement is easily understood in the light of present-day com-
mercial practices. It may once have been true that the warranty
which really induced the sale was normally an actual term of the
contract of sale. Today, however, the significant warranty, the
one which effectively induces the purchase, is frequently that given
by the manufacturer through mass advertising and labeling to ulti-
mate business users or to consumers with whom he has no direct
contractual relationship. 275
The opinion continues by emphasizing the changes that have occurred in
the world of merchandising. Thus, it is no longer a world of direct contract
relying on privity. Rather, it is a world of advertising wherein newspapers,
periodicals, radio and television play a most important, often vital, role in
persuading a vendee to buy products.2Y6 When the representations which have
induced the purchase are demonstrably false and the vendee or ultimate user
or purchaser is damaged by virtue of his reliance thereon, permitting the manu-
facturer to escape liability on the ground of lack or privity seems impossible
to justify. As Mr. Justice Fuld so cogently observes:
269 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra note 16.
270 This would be in line with the suggestion of the Supreme judicial Court of Massachu-
setts in Carter v. Yardley, 319 Mass. 92, 104, 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (1946), a leading case in this
field: "The time has come for us to recognize that the asserted general rule no longer exists. In
principle it was unsound. It tended to produce unjust results. It has been abandoned by the
great weight of authority elsewhere. We now abandon it in this Commonwealth."
271 11 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962).
272 Supra note 2.
273 Supra note 11.
274 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
275 Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., supra note 271.
276 As has been humorously observed, the purpose of advertising is to induce the purchaser
to buy things he doesn't need with money he hasn't got.
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Manufacturers make extensive use of newspapers, periodicals
and other media to call attention, in glowing terms, to the quali-
ties and virtues of their products, and this advertising is directed
at the ultimate consumer or at some manufacturer or supplier
who is not in privity with them. Equally sanguine representations
on packages and labels frequently accompany the article through-
out its journey to the ultimate consumer and, as intended, are
relied upon by remote purchasers. Under these circumstances, it is
highly unrealistic to limit a purchaser's protection to warranties
made directly to him by his immediate seller. The protection he
really needs is against the manufacturer whose published repre-
sentations caused him to make the purchase.
2 77
A further argument of the defendant brings this case to a close degree of
kinship with Spence. American Cyanamid strongly urged the court not to impose
strict liability for breach of warranty on the ground that the fabric shrinkage
which was the basis of the action would not cause personal injury. The Court,
however, declined to follow this suggestion declaring specifically: 278
We perceive no warrant for holding-as the appellant urges
-that strict liability should not here be imposed because the
defect involved, fabric shrinkage, is not likely to cause personal
harm or injury. Although there is language in some of the opinions
which appears to support Cyanamid's contention . . . most of the
courts which have dispensed with the requirement of privity in this
sort of case have not limited their decisions in this manner. And
this makes sense. Since the basis of liability turns not upon the
character of the product but upon the representation, there is no
justification for a distinction on the basis of the type of injury
suffered or the type of article or goods involved. 279
V. IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER THE STATUTES
The Uniform Sales Act contains certain provisions dealing with implied
277 Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., supra note 271; in this connection,
the court also remarked: "The policy of protecting the public from injury, physical or pecuni-
ary, resulting from misrepresentations outweighs allegiance to an old and out-moded technical
rule of law which, if observed, might be productive of great injustice. The manufacturer places
his product upon the market and, by advertising and labeling it, represents its quality to the
public in such a way as to induce reliance upon his representations. He unquestionably intends
and expects that the product will be purchased and used in reliance upon his express assurance
of its quality and, in fact, it is so purchased and used. Having invited and solicited the use, the
manufacturer should not be permitted to avoid responsibility, when the expected use leads to
injury and loss, by claiming that he made no contract directly with the user."
278 "It is true that in many cases the manufacturer will ultimately be held accountable for
the falsity of his representations, but only after an unduly wasteful process of litigation. Thus,
if the consumer or ultimate business user sues and recovers, for breach of warranty, from his
immediate seller and if the latter, in turn, sues and recovers against his supplier in recoupment
of his damages and costs, eventually, after several separate actions by those in the chain of dis-
tribution, the manufacturer may finally be obliged 'to shoulder the responsibility which should
have been his in the first instance.'" Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11
N.Y.2d 5, 13, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 368, 181 N.E.2d 399, 403 (1962).
279 Id. at 15, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 369-70, 181 N.E.2d at 403-04; and the court trenchantly
signalizes: "Indeed, and it points up the injustice of the rule, insistence upon the privity re-
quirement may well leave the aggrieved party, whether he be ultimate business user or con-
sumer, without a remedy in a number of situations. For instance, he would be remediless either
where his immediate seller's representations as to quality were less extravagant or enthusiastic
than those of the manufacturer or where ... there has been an effective disclaimer of any and
all warranties by the plaintiff's immediate seller. . . ." Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co., supra at 14, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 368-69, 181 N.E.2d at 403.
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warranties.2" These have not, however, been uniformly interpreted or con-
strued by the courts.2"' And the Uniform Commercial Code has not retained
the phraseology of the Sales Act.
Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose
UNIFORM SALES ACT
Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that
behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality
or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a
contract to sell or a sale, except as follows:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known
to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are re-
quired, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or
judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not),
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably





Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that
the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit
for such purpose.
2 82
It is noteworthy that where the Sales Act requires the buyer to make
known to the seller "the particular purpose for which the goods are required,"
the Code places the emphasis on the vendor who is merely required to have
"reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required";
both statutes follow the common law in requiring that the buyer rely "on the
seller's skill or judgment" if there is to be an implied warranty "that the goods
shall be fit (or 'reasonably fit') for such purpose." ' 4
280 Section 15.
281 Especially with respect to the notice requirement, the validity of a disclaimer provision,
and as to whether privity is essential in an action for breach of constructive or implied-in-law
warranty.
282 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15; the warranties in this section are limited by the following
language:
(3) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty
as regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed.
(4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified article under
its patent or other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness
for any particular purpose.
As to the latter limitation, see Bravo v. C. H. Tiebout & Sons, Inc., 40 Misc.2d 558, 243
N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1963), where the employee of the purchaser of a grinding wheel
brought this action for injuries he sustained when the wheel broke. The court held that the
grinding wheel had been purchased "under its patent or other trade name" (N.Y. PERS. PROP.
LAWS § 96(4) [supra § 15(4), UNIFORM SALES ACT]), and that therefore, there was "no
implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose." The Uniform Commercial Code,
having been adopted in New York effective September 27 this year, will supersede this pro-
vision which is not reproduced therein.
283 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
284 The significance of these requirements is aptly pointed out in Fossum v. Timber Struc-
tures, Inc., 54 Wash. 2d 317, 341 P.2d 157 (1959), where the action was brought by certain
warehouse owners against the manufacturer-installer of bowstring trusses when the warehouse
collapsed because of the defective character of the trusses. The manufacturer defended on the
ground that there was no "implied warranty that the trusses would be fit or suitable for the par-
ticular purpose" required by plaintiffs under the Sales Act embodied in ROW 63.04.160. As
noted above there are two prerequisites, as the court points out: (1) Knowledge by the vendor
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The distinction between the implied warranty of fitness and that of
merchantable quality has been aptly stated by a federal court applying state
law: "Under a warranty of fitness for a particular use, the seller warrants that
the goods sold are suitable for the special purpose of the buyer, while a war-
ranty of merchantability is that the goods are reasonably fit for the general
purposes for which they are sold."2 '
Warranty of Merchantable Quality
UNIFORM SALES ACT
Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that
behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality
or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a
contract to sell or a sale, except as follows: ...
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a seller
who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower
or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the
goods shall be of merchantable quality.2 6
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(1) Unless excluded or modified ;2s7
(a) a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied
in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of
food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere
is a sale.
288
A comparison of the aforequoted sections of the Sales Act and Code indi-
cates that the Code has substantially embodied the warranty of merchantable
quality formulated in the Sales Act. Although the expression "whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not" has been omitted, the words in the Code "if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind" do not exclude a grower
or manufacturer provided he is also a merchant.2"' There is one significant ad-
of the particular purpose for which the goods are required as disclosed to him by the buyer; and
(2), reliance by the buyer upon the vendor's skill and judgment, citing Ringstad v. I. Magnin
& Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952). The defendant argued that the contract express-
ly specified the weight the roof trusses were to hold and this precluded "any implied warranty
that the trusses would hold any greater weight." Of course, this argument failed because here
the defendant had not only undertaken to fabricate the trusses, but also to design them "with
load factors that would be sufficient to support the roof of this particular warehouse."
Finally, defendant contended that as the written contract had merged all prior negotia-
tions and understandings, no evidence should be admitted to vary its terms. In reply to this,
the court pointed out:
"Appellant's position ignores the very nature of an implied warranty. Such a warranty
is an obligation which the law imposes without regard to any supposed agreement of the parties.
It is neither promissory nor contractual in its nature." 341 P.2d at 170. Citing Bekkevold v.
Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927), relied on in many cases for this characterization of
a "constructive" (implied-in-law) warranty. The court then concluded, "the parol evidence
rule has no proper application to the evidence here bearing on the presence of a warranty in-
dependently imposed by law. The written contract of the parties still stands as the unimpeached
express of the terms agreed to by the parties . . ." 341 P.2d at 170. Affirming judgment for
plaintiffs.
285 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 1961).
286 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(2).
287 Citing UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 "Exclusion or Modification of Warranties."
288 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-314.
289 It seems improbable that this change in terminology will have any great significance
since the responsibility imposed rests on any merchant-seller. As to the exact meaning of the
expression "if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind," there may be some
diversity since there appears to be no definition in § 1-201 "General Definitions," of the term
"merchant."
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dition: " the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on
the premises or elsewhere is a sale."2" ° Thus ends a conflict in the decisions as
to whether a restaurant owner is subject to an implied or constructive warranty
in connection with the food or beverages he serves, since the early common law
did not regard this as a sale. Actually, this should have made no difference since
a warranty imposed by law is not confined to contracts of sale. This point is
aptly illustrated by the warranty of seaworthiness which is not dependent upon
contract but creates an absolute liability on the part of the shipowner or steve-
dore.2" ' This is emphasized by the majority opinion in Italia Societa v. Oregon
Stevedoring Co.,292 decided in March of this year by the Supreme Court of the
United States. What is especially interesting to note is that various leading cases
on "constructive" or implied-in-law warranties having nothing to do with ad-
miralty law are cited.29
In this connection, the not infrequently repeated statement that a sale is
required if there is to be a warranty 94 is subject to justifiable criticism. On this
290 UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE § 2-314.
291 As has been observed the constructive warranty has been extended to foodstuffs, bever-
ages, other similar articles, mechanical devices and other products which may cause death or
injury to the consumer or user, and even to cinder blocks, but there has been no extension of
this implied-in-law warranty like the development of the warranty of seaworthiness, see 4 WrL-
LISTON, CONTRACTS § 643, 1101-09 (3d ed. Jaeger 1961). From its modest beginning in
The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1902), through the classic Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362
U.S. 539 (1960), down to Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., Inc., 376 U.S. 315 (1964),
this warranty, by judicial construction has been steadily enlarged. Now, the protection afforded
to seamen and longshoremen, when engaged "in the ship's service," has emerged as "a form of
absolute duty." Grzybowski v. Arrow Barge Co., 283 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1960); 4 WILLISTON,
op. cit. supra § 643, 1103-04 n.20.
This warranty has been likened to the "implied warranty the manufacturer assumes as to
the soundness of his product or its suitability for a particular use [citing Booth Steamship Co.
v. Meier & Oelhaf Co., 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1958)]. Nor is privity of contract a require-
ment, for the Supreme Court of the United States has said that third parties not in privity may
recover as third party beneficiaries." 4 WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra § 643, at 1106, quoting Water-
man Steamship Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960), and citing Crumady
v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959), 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 576.
292 Supra note 291.
293 All of the leading cases, including Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350
U.S. 124 (1956), described by the Supreme Court of the United States as "the landmark de-
cision in this area," are collected and many of them discussed in Italia Societa v. Oregon
Stevedoring Co., supra note 291. In the majority opinion the concept of "constructive" war-
ranty receives a further extension, and the stevedore incurs absolute liability regardless of negli-
Fence. Said the Court: "This undertaking [to perform 'properly and safely'] is the stevedore's
warranty of workmanlike service that is comparable to a manufacturer's warranty of the sound-
ness of its manufactured product,' a warranty generally deemed to cover defects not attributable
to a manufacturer's negligence." 376 U.S. 318, quoting Ryan supra at 133-34, and citing, inter
alia, Crumady supra note 291; Hessler Co. v. Hillwood Mfg. Co., 302 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1962);
Green v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 11; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra
note 1; UNIFORM SALES ACT, § 15(1) stated supra in text preceding note 282. The court also
noted that in Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963) it had assumed, without deciding, "that
a shipowner could recover over from a stevedore for breach of warranty even though the
injury-causing defect was latent and the stevedore without fault. We think," continued the
Court "that the stevedore's implied warranty of workmanlike performance .. . is sufficiently
broad to include the respondent's failure to furnish safe equipment pursuant to its contract
with the shipowner, notwithstanding that the stevedore would not be liable in tort for its con-
duct," 376 U.S. at 320. (Emphasis added.) The Court also pointed out that if the stevedore is
liable in warranty where he supplies defective, injury-producing equipment, the provisions of the
longshoremen & harbor workers' compensation acts, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§
901-50 (1958), will not bar recovery.
294 This appears in any number of cases and may be considered accurate if it refers to the
specific warranties, such as express and implied-in-fact warranties which form part of the con-
sideration of a contract of sale. However, where the warranties imposed by law regardless of
a vendor-vendee relationship, contract considerations should play no part or, at least, a sale is
unnecessary to the existence of the warranty.
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point, the case of Hadley v. Hillcrest Dairy, Inc.29 is quite illuminating. A bottle
of milk, when removed from the refrigerator after having been purchased from
defendant's salesman, shattered and cut the plaintiff's right thumb and hand.
Defendant asserted that as the milk bottle was returnable, there was no sale
and therefore, no warranty. The court concluded that this was of no moment:
"In our view it is immaterial whether or not the property in the jug passed to
the plaintiff .... We are now of opinion that a sale of the container, as such,
is not necessary in order for the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability
to attach in this transaction." '2 96 In support, The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts quoted from the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Geddling v.
Marsh,297 where the almost identical provisions of the English Sale of Goods
Act were construed.29 The Court observed that where there was such close
similarity of the pertinent sections, each of the respective acts would be "en-
titled to consideration. 299
Reverting to the warranty of merchantability, it will be seen that in any
number of cases, this warranty has been put to effective use by the courts; aside
from the food cases, two outstanding illustrations are afforded by Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,"'0 and Chapman v. Brown."' In each of these the
courts did not hesitate to give judgment for the plaintiffs for breach of the
warranty of merchantability despite the lack of privity of warranty. 2
However, the aforequoted warranties are limited in their effect by (1) a
requirement of notice as a condition precedent to recovery by the buyer against
the seller, and (2) the recognition of the validity of a disclaimer provision
properly stated."0 2
Notice
From the following provisions of the uniform statutes, it will be observed
that the buyer must notify the vendor of breach of warranty within a reasonable
time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach:
295 341 Mass. 624, 171 N.E.2d 293 (1961).
296 Id., at 295.
297 [1920] 1 K. B. 668; in this case bottled beverages were sold at retail by plaintiff. A
deposit was required on each bottle by the manufacturer which was refunded when the bottle
was returned. One of the bottles exploded and injured the plaintiff while she was handling it
in her shop. Her action was based on the implied warranty of fitness and the trial judge gave
judgment for plaintiff. It was held that it was immaterial that there had been no sale of the
bottle. This was challenged by defendant manufacturer.
The Court of Appeals sustained the judgment below and concluded that whether the bottle
was sold or not would not alter the liability of the manufacturer on the implied warranty which
had clearly been breached.
298 In the English Sale of Goods Act the pertinent section corresponding to UNIFORMS SALES
ACT § 15 is § 14. The Uniform Sales Act has since been superseded by the adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code in Massachusetts.
299 Quoting Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 95, 120 N.E. 225, 227,
Hadley v. Hillcrest Dairy, Inc., supra note 295 at 295.
300 Supra note 1.
301 Supra note 2.
302 Both cases are discussed in some detail in Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin
Sounded? I DUQUESNE U.L. REv. 1 (1963), and Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and
Fitness for Use, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 493 (1962).
303 As to notice generally, see 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 887B, 887BB (3d ed. Jaeger
1962) ; recently, there has been a tendency to hold disclaimer provisions in contracts of ad-
hesion invalid as against public policy, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1, and
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 175, reversal upheld on rehearing, 34 Cal. Rptr.
723 (Cal. App. 1963), modified, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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UNIFORM SALES ACT
In the absence of express or implied agreement of the parties,
acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall not discharge the seller
from liability in damages or other legal remedy for breach of
any promise or warranty in the contract to sell or the sale. But
if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fail to give notice to
the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty within a
reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such
breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor.304
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers or should have discovered any breach notify
the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy;
305
Of the Uniform Sales Act provision, Professor Williston says:
This section of the Statute treats the seller's tender of the goods
as an offer of them in full satisfaction, but the buyer is allowed
a reasonable time for accepting the offer. Moreover, if he declines
to take the goods in full satisfaction he' need not return them.
The practical advantages of the statutory rule and its ease and
certainty of application commend it.30 s
The purpose of the notice requirement, as the courts have sig-
nalized, "is to advise the seller that he must meet a claim for dam-
ages, as to which, rightly or wrongly, the law requires that he shall
have an early warning."30 7
Both statutes, it will be noted, require the buyer to give reasonable notice;
however, a rather strict construction given the Uniform Sales Act in some juris-
dictions to the effect that the nature of the defect, the damage caused thereby,
and the intent to hold the vendor must be disclosed has led to the change in
terminology to be found in the equivalent Code provision. It is clear from the
official comments"'3 that its draftsmen intended to liberalize the notice require-
ment so that the rights of noncommercial buyers would not be jeopardized.0"
Nevertheless, under the wording of either statute the question of what
should be deemed "a reasonable time" will still continue to plague the courts and
must be resolved upon the basis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
individual transaction." 0
304 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 49; Acceptance Does Not Bar Action For Damages.
305 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3) (a).
306 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 714 (3d ed. Jaeger 1961), at 399.
307 American Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Board, 7 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1925). quoted
with approval in Columbia Axle Co. v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 63 F.2d 206 (6th
Cir. 1933), in Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal.2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948), and in Reininger v.
Eldon Manufacturing Co., 114 Cal. App.2d 240, 250 P.2d 4 (1952). RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS § 412 (1932), reads: "Under a contract for the sale of goods, the failure of the
buyer, after acceptance of goods tendered as performance of the contract, to give notice to the
seller of the latter's breach of any promise or warranty, within a reasonable time after the buyer
knows or has reason to know of such breach, discharges the seller's duty to make compensation."
308 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607, comment 4.
309 The rule requiring notification is said to be "designed to defeat commercial bad faith,
not to deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy."
310 United States v. Dewart Milk Prod. Co., 300 Fed. 448 (M.D. Pa. 1924), construing Pa.
Act, 10 months' delay discoverable by inspection is unreasonable; Ruggles v. Buffalo Foundry
Co., 27 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1928) applying Mich. Act, one year's delay in giving notice in a
contract for sale of a brine evaporator is unreasonable; Owen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 273 F.2d
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Above all, where the warranty is constructive and imposed by operation
of law, there is no occasion for requiring notification of danger or injury to the
vendor by a remote consumer or user not in privity of contract. 1
Disclaimer
The uniform statutes recognize the validity of a disclaimer provision re-
jecting liability based on what would otherwise be breach of warranty, provided
that the statutory provisions are observed.
UNIFORM SALES ACT
Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a con-
tract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be negatived
or varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing between
the parties, or by custom, if the custom be such as to bind both
parties to the contract or the sale.312
Even an express disclaimer may be found contrary to public policy as was
the case in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc,"'5 where the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, speaking through Mr. Justice Francis, reviews many cases wherein
a standardized disclaimer provision was held inoperative as not being a part of
140 (9th Cir. 1959), delay of two years in giving notice that shirt was defective held un-
reasonable.
Elkus Co. v. Voeckel, 27 Ariz. 332, 233 P. 57 (1925), where goods to retailer contained
a defect not readily discoverable, notice given as soon as retailer received complaints from cus-
tomers was reasonable; Mutual Electric Co. v. Turner Eng. Co., 230 Mich. 63, 202 N.W. 964
(1925), delay of several years held not excessive, as a matter of law, in view of constant efforts
to obviate cause of complaint; Stewart v. Menzel, 181 Minn. 347, 232 N.W. 522 (1930), delay
of 6 months in giving notice of defects in fur coat unreasonable; Laundry Service Co. v. Fidel-
ity Laund. Mach. Co., 187 Minn. 180, 245 N.W. 36 (1932), delay of 5 months in discovery
and claiming defects in laundry machine held unreasonable.
Mastin v. Boland, 178 App. Div. 421, 165 N.Y. Supp. 468 (Sup. Ct. 1917), 3 weeks held
reasonable when the buyer did not know the seller's name and address; Ficklen Tobacco Co. v.
Friedberg, 196 App. Div. 409, 187 N.Y. Supp. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1925), a year is an unreasonable
time; Stone v. Bleim, 176 N.Y. Supp. 25 (Sup. Ct. 1919), 10 days not unreasonable as matter
of law; Pierce Foundation Corp. Co. v. Eagle Supply Co., 180 N.Y. Supp. 88 (Sup. Ct. 1920), 4
months held unreasonable; Kaufman v. Levy, 102 Misc. 689, 169 N.Y. Supp. 454 (Sup. Ct.
1918), notice given immediately after examination of the goods held unreasonable when ex-
amination was deferred for 23 days, where it was customary to examine goods within 10 days;
Gleason v. Lebolt, 126 Misc. 216, 212 N.Y. Supp. 227 (Sup. Ct. 1925), 5 months' delay in dis-
covering defect in diamond and giving notice is reasonable as matter of law.
Walsterholme v. Randall, 295 Pa. 131, 144 Ad. 909 (1929), notice after 11 days reason-
able even though material had to be manufactured into cloth within that period; Bodek v.
Avrack, 297 Pa. 225, 146 Ad. 546 (1929), 3 months, as matter of law, unreasonable in sale of
blankets; Kull v. General Motors Truck Co., 311 Pa. 580, 166 Ad. 562 (1933), notice of breach
of warranty as to age of trucks given 2 years after sale held barred by laches; Patterson Foundry
Co. v. Williams Lacquer Co., 52 R.I. 149, 158 Adt. 721 (1932), delay of 6 months in giving
notice of defects in lacquer grinding mill held unreasonable.
Suryan v. Lake Washington Shipyards, 153 Wash. 164, 300 Pac. 941 (1931), delay of
notice 1 month reasonable in sale of fishing boat; Chess & Wymond Co. v. La Crosse Box Co.,
173 Wis. 382, 181 N.W. 313 (1921), several months unreasonable; Knobel v. J. Bartel Co.,
176 Wis. 393,187 N.W. 188 (1922), expert testimony not admissible to prove 25 days a reason-
able time; Buck v. Racine Boat Co., 180 Wis. 245, 192 N.W. 998 (1923), three or four days
held reasonable as matter of law; Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis.
209, 240 N.W. 392 (1932), 20 months' delay in giving notice of defects in boiler tubes pre-
cluded recovery, annotation, 72 A.L.R. 726; Schroeder v. Drees, 1 Wis. 2d 106, 83 N.W.2d 707
(1957), citing Marsh Wood Products v. Babcock & Wilcox, supra.
311 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra note 2.
312 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 71.
313 Supra note 1; the case is discussed at some length in 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 643
(3d ed. Jaeger 1961), where the following appears, referring to Henningsen: "Destined to be-
come a leading precedent in the field of implied warranties, the decision held the manufacturer
and the vendor of the automobile in question liable. . ." at 1097-98.
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the contract. " Applying the rule of strict construction against the author of a
contract, and more severely, of a disclaimer clause, the court observed:...
The task of the judiciary is to administer the spirit as well
as the letter of the law. On issues such as the present one, part
of that burden is to protect the ordinary man against the loss of
important rights through what, in effect, is the unilateral act of
the manufacturer. The status of the automobile industry is unique.
Manufacturers are few in number and strong in bargaining posi-
tion. In the matter of warranties on the sale of their products,
the Automotive Manufacturers Association has enabled them to
present a united front. From the standpoint of the purchaser,
there can be no arms length negotiating on the subject. Because
his capacity for bargaining is so grossly unequal,, the inexorable
conclusion which follows is that he is not permitted to bargain
at all. He must take or leave the automobile on the warranty
terms dictated by the maker. He cannot turn to a competitor for
better security.3 16
Public policy at a given time finds expression in the Con-
stitution, the statutory law and in judicial decisions. In the area
of sale of goods, the legislative will has imposed an implied war-
ranty of merchantability as a general incident of sale of an auto-
mobile by description. The warranty does not depend upon the
affirmative intention of the parties. It is a child of the law; it
annexes itself to the contract because of the very nature of the
transaction.317 The judicial process has recognized a right to
recover damages for personal- injuries arising from a breach of
that warranty. The disclaimer of the implied warranty and exclu-
sion of all obligations except those specifically assumed by the
express warranty signify a studied effort to frustrate that protec-
tion. True, the Sales Act authorizes agreements between buyer and
seller qualifying the warranty obligations. But quite obviously
the Legislature contemplated lawful stipulations (which are de-
termined by the circumstances of a particular case) arrived at
freely by parties of relatively equal bargaining strength. The law-
makers did not authorize the automobile manufacturer to use its
grossly disproportionate bargaining power to relieve itself from
liability and to impose on the ordinary buyer, who in effect has
no real freedom of choice, the grave danger of injury to himself
and others that attends the sale of such a dangerous instrumentality
314 This being the standard automotive contract provision limiting the liability of the manu-
facturer for defective parts to a period of 90 days or a distance of 4,000 miles whichever should
happen sooner; the standard provision is quoted infra note 320.
315 Referring to the aforementioned disclaimer provision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
makes the following trenchant observation: "The terms of the warranty are a sad commentary
upon the automobile manufacturers' marketing practices. Warranties developed in the law in
the interest of and to protect the ordinary consumer who cannot be expected to have the knowl-
edge or capacity or even the opportunity to make adequate inspection of mechanical instru-
mentalities, like automobiles and to decide for himself whether they are reasonably fit for the
designed purpose.... But the ingenuity of the Automobile Manufacturer's Association, by means
of its standardized form, has metamorphosed the warranty into a device to limit the maker's
liability. To call it an equivocal agreement, as the Minnesota Supreme Court did, is the least
that can be said in criticism of it." Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 375,
161 A.2d 69, 78 (1960), citing Federal Motor Truck Sales Corp. v. Shanus, 190 Minn. 5, 9,
250 N.W. 713, 715 (1933).
316 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403, 161 A.2d 69, 94 (1960).
317 Citing Minneapolis Steel & Machinery Co. v. Casey Land Agency, 51 N.D. 832, 201
N.W. 172 (1924).
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as a defectively made automobile. In the framework of this case,
illuminated as it is by the facts and the many decisions noted, we
are of the opinion that Chrysler's attempted disclaimer of an
implied warranty of merchantability and of the obligations arising
therefrom is so inimical to the public good as to compel an
adjudication of its invalidity.3 18
A case decided last year, Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 19 found the court
confronted with the same standardized "dealer's warranty."' 20 The trial court
in the action by the injured driver and passenger against the dealer and manu-
facturer based on breach of implied warranty because of brake failure on a new
Ford granted defendants' motion for nonsuit and this appeal followed. The ap-
pellate court held that Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 21 was controlling
as to lack of privity not constituting a valid defense. Also, since the Supreme
Court of California in Greenman had relied "heavily on Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc." '22 with respect to the invalidity of the disclaimer provision, it
concluded that this "contract of adhesion" was not enforceable, stating:
In this situation the releasing party does not really acquiesce
voluntarily in the contractual shifting of the risk, nor can we be
reasonably certain that he receives an adequate consideration
for the transfer. Since the service is one which each member of
the public, presently or potentially, may find essential to him, he
faces, despite his economic inability to do so, the prospect of a
compulsory assumption of the risk of another's negligence. The
public policy of this state has been, in substance, to posit the
risk of negligence upon the actor; in instances in which this policy
has been abandoned, it has generally been to allow or require
that the risk shift to another party better or equally able to bear
it, not to shift the risk to the weaker bargainer.3 23
And the court concluded: "Therefore, since the disclaimer clause in the
318 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960).
The court, at 386-98, 161 A.2d at 84-92, reviews a great variety of purported disclaimers and
finds that they do not enjoy any degree of favor in the courts; they are strictly interpreted, if
not construed, against the author and unless clearly a part of the contract, will be held in-
effectual as in Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953), cited in Henningsen,
supra note 1.
319 33 Cal. Rptr. 175, reversal upheld on rehearing, 34 Cal. Rptr. 723 (Cal. App. 1963),
modified, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
320 This "dealer's warranty" reads: "Dealer warrants to Purchaser (except as hereinafter
provided) each part of each Ford Motor Company product sold by Dealer to Purchaser to be
free under normal use and service from defects in material and workmanship for a period of
ninety (90) days from the date of delivery of such product to Purchaser, or until such product
has been driven, used or operated for a distance of four thousand (4,000) miles, whichever
event first shall occur. Dealer makes no warranty whatsoever with respect to tires or tubes.
Dealer's obligation under this warranty is limited to replacement, without charge to Purchaser,
of such parts as shall be returned to Dealer and as shall be acknowledged by Dealer to be de-
fective. This warranty shall not apply to any Ford Motor Company product that has been sub-ject to misuse, negligence, or accident or in which parts not made or supplied by Ford Motor
Company shall have been used if, in the determination of Dealer, such use shall have affected
its performance, stability, or reliability, or which shall have been altered or repaired outside
of Dealer's place of business in a manner which, in the determination of Dealer, shall have af-
fected its performance, stability, or reliability. This warranty is expressly in lieu of all other
warranties, express or implied, and of all other obligations on the part of the Dealer." Vander-
mark v. Ford Motor Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 175, 181 (Cal. App. 1963).
321 Supra note 2.
322 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 320, at 181.
323 Quoting Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 38, 383
P.2d 441, 446 (1963).
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warranty agreement is void, there are present still the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose." '24
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Exclusion or Modification of Warranties. S25
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must
mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be con-
spicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness
the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language
to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states,
for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond
the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults"
or other language which in common understanding calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain
that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has
examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired
or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty
with regard to defects which an examination ought in the cir-
cumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by
course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade s.3 2
The distinction the Uniform Commercial Code makes between disclaimer
of the warranty of merchantability and the warranty of fitness for particular
purpose is significant. Where the first is to be excluded, "merchantability" must
be specifically mentioned; as to the warranty of fitness, the language may be
general, but it must be in "writing and conspicuous." There is also an impor-
tant limitation on disclaimer:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or
who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who
is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
327
In Boeing Airplane Company v. O'Malley,2 ' the federal district court held
that an implied warranty of fitness for the purpose for which a helicopter was
intended had been made under the Uniform Commercial Code as originally
enacted in Pennsylvania 2 9 The parties themselves had agreed that the law of
Pennsylvania should govern the contract of sale of the Vertol helicopter. When
judgment was given in favor of plaintiff buyer for breach of the implied
warranty, defendant vendor appealed on the ground that the trial court had
committed error "in holding that there was an implied warranty as a matter of
324 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 320, at 182.
325 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
326 As to custom or usage of trade, see 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS ch. 23 (3d ed. Jaeger
1961).
327 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
328 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964).
329 The original provision with respect to disclaimers differed from that quoted above in text.
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law," and that the alleged disclaimer inserted in the contract should not have
been held ineffectual under the Uniform Commercial Code in its amended
form. 3 0
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding
that the buyer had disclosed to the seller the purpose for which the helicopter
was to be used, and had relied on the skill and judgment of the vendor to
select and furnish a suitable aircraft for the specified purpose.331 A detailed ex-
amination of the testimony adduced at the trial supported the conclusion that
the implied warranty had been breached, and that, under the pertinent provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the purported disclaimer was in-
effectual since it had not been made specifically as the original Code provision
required. The appellate court further held that when the contract of sale was
entered into, the amended Code which permitted a general disclaimer of the
implied warranty of fitness had not yet become effective. 32 Consequently, the
contract of sale, including the purported disclaimer, was governed by the original
Code provision. 33
VI. PRODUCT LIABILITY: DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP ACTIONS
Of the many facets of product liability none is more intriguing than the
diversity of citizenship case requiring an Erie33 -educated guess as to what the
state court would do in an action for a breach of constructive warranty where
privity is lacking. Two of the most interesting and instructive cases show the
federal courts to have been mistaken in their estimate of what the state court
would have done. In the first, the Third Circuit, going along with the current
of authority and its analysis of Pennsylvania jurisprudence as revealed in the
earlier cases,3 5 concluded that "privity had been obliterated in Pennsylvania
law." This view, expressed in Mannsz v. Macwhite Co.,3 ' was followed in a
number of subsequent cases."3 7 However, some 18 years later, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corporation,8' declared other-
wise. The Court recognized that a substantial number of jurisdictions, including
Pennsylvania, had abolished the privity requirement as to food products but
330 It was clear that the contract of sale of the helicopter had been entered into in October,
1959, and the amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code became effective in Pennsylvania
as of January 1, 1960. Consequently, the court held that the original section 2-316 as to ex-
clusion or modification of warranties governed this transaction. Thereunder, the purported
disclaimer was ineffectual.
331 The court quotes UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, Implied Warranties: Fitness
for Particular Purpose, supra note 283.
332 The court cites Paramount Paper Products Co. v. Lynch, 182 Pa. Super. 504, 128 A.2d
157 (1956) and L. & N. Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa. Super. 117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958).
333 The original provision of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, reads: "(1) If the
agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative." Also, in para-
graph 2, it stated that exclusion or modification of implied warranties "must be in specific
language."
Cf. Wilson v. Manhasset Ford, Inc., 209 N.Y.S.2d 210 (D.C. 1960) holding that disclaim-
ers in motor vehicle sales transactions "must not offend against public policy."
334 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
335 Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942).
336 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946).
337 McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn. 1960); Thompson v.
Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961). Cf. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super.
422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
338 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
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that it would be adhered to as to other products unless the consumer or user was
"within the distributive chain." This may be taken to mean that the injured
party must be a purchaser, sub-purchaser or sub-sub-purchaser, or a member
of the family or household or a guest of the buyer."3 9
The Fifth Circuit was on the verge of a similar misapprehension when,
after a rehearing, and largely because of a logical and well-reasoned dissent
based on a careful analysis of the Florida precedents, the federal court referred
the case of Green v. American Tobacco Company3 4 to the Supreme Court
of Florida under a statute which provided for this procedure."' The majority
must have received quite a jolt when they read the opinion of Chief Justice E.
Harris Drew. He made it crystal-clear that the earlier Florida cases had dis-
carded privity; with tobacco assimilated to food products, the manufacturer's
liability was absolute. 2
In two of the insular jurisdictions, the federal courts were called upon to
make a similar estimate of the local legal situation. In Puerto Rico the case
was Coca-Cola Bottling of Puerto Rico v. Negron Torres;4 s in Hawaii it was
Chapman v. Brown."4' In each the federal court concluded that privity was
passe, and each was affirmed on appeal. 45
Most recently, the Fifth Circuit, in Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis,346 speaking
in rather humorous vein and "writing with an Erie-Texas pen," concluded that:
"While it may be true that Plaintiff is not in privity with Ford we do not regard
the Texas courts as requiring privity in this situation. The Supreme Court of
Texas has said that privity 'applies only when one is seeking to enforce a con-
tract.' ,s After discussing a number of the leading cases, including Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc,"48 the court goes on to say:
But approaching it as does the Supreme Court of Texas on
the straightforward plane of public policy in protecting what it
conceives to be precious Texas lives, we cannot believe that it will
differentiate between a Texan felled by a microbe and one kiled
by a negligently defective machine hurtling through space at great,
but expected, speed.3 49
The court cites a number of cases wherein a federal tribunal was called
upon to apply state law where precedents were lacking or inconclusive; among
these may be mentioned B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond,"0 Chapman v.
Brown,"'1 McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co.,3"2 and Taylorson v. American Air-
339 This is according to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, extending the benefit of
either express or implied warranties to .members of the family or household, and to guests of the
buyer.
340 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
341 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1959).
342 Green v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 11.
343 255 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958).
344 Supra note 2.
345 Supra note 343 and Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
346 Supra note 212.
347 Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267, 275 (5th Cir. 1963), quoting Jacob E. Decker
& Sons v. Capps, supra note 11.
348 Supra note 1.
349 Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, supra note 347, at 276.
350 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959).
351 Supra note 2.
352 Supra note 337.
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lines, Inc. 3 ' The court then noted that in several cases, Florida had rejected the
Fifth Circuit's appraisal of Florida law:354
"And in the undulating field of products liability Florida has
again registered its authoritative disagreement. Green v. American
Tobacco Co.355 answering questions certified by us, in effect
reversing our earlier holding.356 What the fate of our recent deci-
sions for Mississippi and Louisiana will be, only time, tide and
litigation will tell."' 5
7
Many more examples could be adduced to show the grave difficulties
which are encountered when the federal courts undertake to predict what the
state courts would do in the situation confronting them. This uncertainty and
lack of uniformity may have unfortunate results on plaintiff's case as in O'Shea
v. Chrysler Corporation."' There, his choice of forum was fatal to plaintiff's
recovery.359
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In discussing the subject of privity of warranty, no particularly compelling
reason seems to exist which would require that breach of warranty be classified
as either an action in tort or an action in contract. °60 Tort has long been identified
with some form of fault, negligence or lack of due care, and yet today, a number
of courts are adopting the concept of absolute liability on the part of the
manufacturer, producer, or processor of certain types of goods."8 1 Basically, greater
protection of the consuming public is the goal, regardless of the existence of
privity of contract.'6 2
353 183 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
354 Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1961) and Barnes v. Pennsyl-
vania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 146 So.2d 119 (Fla. App. 1962).
355 Supra note 11.
356 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
357 Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, supra note 347, at 269-70 n.1.
358 206 F. Supp. 601 (D. N.J. 1962); what makes this case especially interesting is that it
concerned an action by the driver of a defective Dodge who alleged that the steering mechanism
failed causing a collision with another vehicle. He alleged breach of certain warranties in his
action against the manufacturer. It seems that the issues had been litigated in an earlier action
in New York which decided that the law of Washington, D.C., where the Dodge was bought was
applicable. As to this point, the court, at 605, said: "It is, indeed, unfortunate for the plaintiff
that he chose to litigate the issues of breach of warranty and negligence between the parties in
the forum of New York where, under its conflicts of law principles, the law of Washington, D.C.,
is applicable and privity of contract is necessary to sustain the action. The plaintiff's attempt
at recovery in the New York action on the breach of warranty and negligence issues resulted
in a dismissal on the merits for lack of privity, and the attempt at recovery for contribution on
the contributing negligence issue resulted in a jury verdict against him, exonerating the de-
fendant from any negligence contributing to the accident. Having had those issues determined
adversely to him he cannot now by the present action raise the same issues by asserting a differ-
ent cause of action, for the issues have been adjudicated."
To add to the irony of the situation, less than six weeks later, Picker X-Ray Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., supra note 11, decided that lack of privity should be no defense in this
type of action.
359 O'Shea v. Chrysler Corp., supra note 358.
360 As has heretofore been thought; but see supra note 10.
361 As in Green v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 11; Chapman v. Brown, supra note
2; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra note 11; Simpson v. Powered Products of
Michigan, Inc., supra note 11; citing Hamon v. Digliani, supra note 11; Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., supra note 1; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., supra note 11; Mor-
row v. Caloric Appliance Corp., supra note 2, to mention but a few of the most recent
precedents.
362 This is clearly emphasized in Chapman v. Brown, supra note 2; Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, supra note 11; Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., supra note 2; Henningsen
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Summary
It appears that there has been a gradual, an almost imperceptible evolution
towards a separate and distinct action of breach of warranty which will depend
neither upon contractual requirements nor tort considerations. In other fields
of law there has been a similar evolution, as witness the emergence of the col-
lective labor agreement368 as a contract "affected with a public interest," '64 and
of the joint venture as a separate and distinct business association differing
from the partnership,6 5 although having a number of similar characteristics. 66
There has always been a tendency by the courts to conform new developments
to some existing legal concept. However, the result is often like pouring new
wine into old bottles: the experiment is frequently fraught with disaster. In a
rapidly expanding industrial and mechanical economy characterized by electronic
devices, jet propulsion, atomic fission, nuclear energy and the many other
perilous innovations that beset humanity, it is high time that public policy looked
out for the consumer since he is no longer able to look out for himself. In many
instances, it is impossible to examine the product that is being purchased without
destroying it. There are many latent defects, noxious substances and other harm-
ful items lurking in sealed packages, canned goods, bottled beverages and other
containers to injure the consumer. Social justice and public policy demand that
the risk of loss be distributed over the greatest number of those who can best
bear it. There are ways and means whereby the manufacturer or processor can
protect himself: An increase in the price of his product and insurance covering
product liability have been suggested. 6 ' Conversely, the individual consumer is
ordinarily not in a financial position to assume the risk of loss to a comparable
degree. Continued unemployment because of sickness or injury may place him
and his family under an unbearable economic strain. When death results, the
effect on the surviving dependents is often incalculable.
From the analysis of recent cases, the conclusion is inescapable that a
steadily growing majority of jurisdictions have obliterated the privity require-
ment in actions for breach of warranty in the traditional field of foods, beverages
and other products intended for human use or consumption. But what is most
significant is that an increasing number are going beyond to include mechanical
devices such as automotive vehicles, aircraft, and their accessories. A few jurisdic-
tions have even gone the entire distance and simply eliminated privity by judicial
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 1; Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,
supra note 2; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., supra note 11; see also Ford Motor Co.
v. Mathis, supra note 2.
363 Discussed in Jaeger, Collective Labor Agreements and the Third Party Beneficiary, 1
B.C. IND. & Com. L. RE v. 125 (1960).
364 So described in Jaeger, supra note 363, at 150.
365 See Partnersh~p or Joint Venture? 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 138 (1961).
366 Discussed in Jaeger, Joint Ventures, 9 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 111 (1960), and 2 WILLIS-
TON, CONTRACTS § 318 (3d ed. Jaeger 1959).
367 Typical examples of such insurance are furnished by the following cases: Steams v.
Hertz Corp., 326 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1964); Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Snow, 222 F. Supp.
892 (D. Ore. 1963); Orchard v. Agricultural Insurance Co. of Watertown, New York, 228 F.
Supp. 564 (D. Ore. 1964); Liberty Building Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 2 Cal. Rptr. 329,
346 P.2d 444 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Maretti v. Midland National Insurance Co., 42 Ill. App.
2d 17, 190 N.E.2d 597 (1963).
This is strongly advocated in Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 Du-QUESNE U.L. Rv. 1, at 137, where an analysis in the cases appears.
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decision or by legislation, especially where the warranty is constructive, that is,
imposed by law.
Some of the ways and means (other than tort actions) which have been
employed to hold the manufacturer of a defective product directly liable to the
injured consumer or user thereof include:
1. The consumer or other injured party is the third party beneficiary of
the sales contract made between the purchaser and the vendor.
2. The conduit theory; that is, the vendor is the agent or conduit of the
manufacturer and is as such the intermediary between the latter and the con-
sumer.
3. The buyer is the agent of the injured consumer.
4. The manufacturer who advertises extensively makes a general offer of
warranty to those who use his products.
5. The consumer is a subpurchaser within the distributive chain or conduit.
6. Public policy requires consumer protection or indemnification where
harmful products are manufactured for distribution.
7. By specific legislation, certain jurisdictions have declared that privity
shall be no obstacle to recovery against manufacturer or producer by an injured
consumer.
Conclusion
From the foregoing enumeration of the various ways and means whereby
the consumer has been afforded a remedy against the manufacturer, it is quite
evident that consumer protection has been deemed an essential element of public
policy. However, the thesis of this article is that it is not necessary to adopt any
of these methods of circumvention or repudiation.
The ultimate conclusion: Breach of constructive warranty need not be
classified as either a contract or a tort action. It may properly be entertained
as a separate and distinct remedy wherein the manufacturer or other producer
of harmful or defective products is made absolutely liable to the consumer or
user who is injured thereby.
